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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Due to a globalized market place, risk management has grown in importance and 
become a central part of firms’ corporate strategies. The incentives for engaging in risk 
reducing activities revolve around reduced agency costs and exploitation of financial 
advantages. According to the precautionary motive for holding cash, firms must ensure 
stable and secure access to capital for future investments. This is most prominent for 
firms with high investment opportunities, and firms who rely on R&D and high capital 
expenditures to support future operations. Risk management, and hedging in particular, 
reduces the need for costly external funding, letting firms invest in risky projects. This 
study is designed to look at whether hedging and cash holdings can be seen as 
substitutive risk management tools in the manner that hedgers are allowed to hold lower 
cash reserves. The study also examines if this relationship is strengthened under possible 
underinvestment problems. With a deductive approach, we investigate the effect hedging 
has on cash holdings using multivariate regression analysis. Based on this we find 
evidence that firms with high investment opportunities hold less cash when they hedge. 
We also find that hedgers lower their cash reserves and therefore we suggest that, from a 
risk management perspective, hedging and cash holdings can be seen as substitutes. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Cash Management, Cash Holdings, Risk Management, Hedging, Underinvestment problems, 
Investment Opportunities  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The introductory chapter motivates the relevance of cash management and hedging activities for firms with 
large investment opportunities. The discussion is followed by a problem statement and a research question. 
Finally, we present aim and objectives and limitations of the study, as well as a description  
of the target group. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
“Risk is like fire: If controlled it will help you; if uncontrolled it will rise up and destroy you.” 
 
Theodore Roosevelt  
 
This quote illustrates the importance of managing risks, which has become a central part of 
firms’ corporate strategies. As modern financial theory has evolved, theories that explain the 
value-adding effect of risk management initiatives have led firms to recognize the countless 
advantages from engaging in risk management (Culp, 2001). 
 
The risk management incentives include theories that revolve around reduced agency costs 
and exploitation of financial advantages. Previous research has found that managing risk is 
especially important for firms with large investment opportunities, likelihood of financial 
distress, and volatility in cash flows (Marin and Niehaus, 2011). A prominent issue for such 
firms is potential underinvestment problems, an agency problem that occurs when firms 
avoid less risky projects to increase own wealth at the cost of its creditors (Gay and Nam, 
1998). Risk management reduces the need for costly external funding, letting firms invest in 
risky projects. Also, companies avoid pressure from creditors in form of covenants and high 
interest rates, as the risk of non-repayment is reduced. Other ways for risk management to 
add value is by reducing the likelihood of financial distress, take advantage of tax benefits, 
and make managers more open to invest in risky projects as they can use internal funds for 
investments (Culp, 2001). 
 
There are several ways to manage risks. A common solution is to hedge against risk 
exposures through the use of derivatives, while another alternative is to reduce risk by 
holding excess cash (Culp, 2001). Firms with volatile cash flows can hedge to reduce this 
volatility or hold cash reserves to reduce the effect of volatile cash flows. As both reduce the 
effect of unforeseen events, these risk management tools can be seen as alternatives (Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993; Marin and Niehaus, 2011). Hedging could therefore reduce the 
need to hold costly cash. All firms are however expected to hold cash reserves, but firms that 
hedge should in theory hold less cash. Cash availability is important as it affects a company’s 
ability to react fast on investment opportunities, which might be critical for survival (Mello 
and Parsons, 2000).  
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The motives for holding cash were pointed out already in the 1930s by John Maynard 
Keynes. He explained primarily two reasons for holding cash; the transaction motive and the 
precautionary motive. A company’s cash level determines to which extent it can finance new 
investments without having to raise external funds. Thereby, holding cash may limit 
transaction costs from raising external capital, avoid having to liquidate assets to fund 
projects and help the firm cover short-term needs. The precautionary motive refers to the 
firm’s ability to meet future obligations and act on investment opportunities, which makes 
cash holdings a mechanism to avoid potential underinvestment problems. Cash reserves as 
well as hedging can therefore help firms prepare for unexpected future events.  
 
From a financial perspective, managing risk adds value by decreasing the exposure to 
uncertainties (Miller, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; 
Allayannis and Weston, 2001) Through hedging, a company allows to decrease its cash 
levels and still manage to reduce agency costs. Underinvestment issues are prominent in 
firms that have high investment opportunities with large funding needs, and can be reduced 
through easy access to cash without including external parts. Implementing risk-reducing 
activities may therefore lead to lower risk and add value to more stakeholders.  
 
Biotech and medical equipment firms are characterized by high investment opportunities, 
which encourage risk-limiting activities to avoid potential underinvestment problems. The 
healthcare sector has experienced large changes in the past decade. This has led firms to 
focus on good innovations for optimal returns, as traditional market access models are no 
longer sufficient to capture market shares (The Economist, 2014). This results in an increased 
need for access to capital to invest in research and development (R&D), as well as 
improvement expenditures. US healthcare expenditures, as a percentage of GNP, have grown 
faster than in any other market and continue to do so (Donzon, 1992). The importance of 
continuous development and high capital expenditures is prominent within the Biotech and 
Pharmaceuticals industry and in the Medical Equipment and Devices industry, since R&D 
expenses and capital investments are central aspects. Firms that operate in these industries 
therefore require access to excessive funds. Also, Boston Consulting Group has stated that as 
much as 90% of research expenditures are actually being wasted since drugs fail and 
development cannot proceed, which adds on the need for massive funding (The Economist, 
2014).   
 
Previous research has examined the relationship between cash holdings and hedging for 
financially constrained firms (Bolton, Chen and Wang, 2011; Marin and Niehaus, 2011). Few 
studies have however focused on the two risk management tools as alternative strategies. 
Little attention has also been paid to firms with high investment opportunities. These firms 
are vulnerable to underinvestment problems if internal capital is insufficient to fund 
investments. Hedging reduces overall risk, which allows these firms to use their internal cash 
to fund projects, and limits potential underinvestment issues.  
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Both hedging activities and cash reserves ultimately serve the same purpose, namely 
reducing the effect of volatile cash flows, and could therefore be seen as alternative risk 
management tools (Nance et al, 1993; Opler et al, 1999; Culp, 2001; Bolton et al, 2011). The 
four theoretical motives for risk management to create value1 should therefore affect both 
hedging and cash holdings. The risk management incentives imply that firms that are 
especially vulnerable to these problems also have the most to gain from managing risks.  
 
Firms with large investment opportunities and high expenditures may face these potential 
problems and are therefore prone to engage in risk reducing activities. Firms in the Medical 
Equipment and Devices industry produce and manufacture healthcare products, and are 
dependent on stable cash flows to support production. Similarly, the Biotech and 
Pharmaceutical industry is highly dependent on R&D to be able to compete. For example, 
R&D intensive firms are more likely to hedge since they in general experience difficulties in 
raising external funds due to the nature of their principally intangible assets (Froot et al, 
1993). Not only are intangible assets undesirable collateral, but it is also hard to ensure the 
quality of R&D projects, resulting in asymmetric information between management and 
creditors. Since cash is critical for the firm’s operations, these industries are dependent on 
stable and secure access to capital (Opler and Titman, 1994). Mikkelson and Partch (2003) 
find that firms with high R&D costs hold more cash, which can be explained by their limited 
access to capital markets. The fact that firms with large investment opportunities hold more 
cash can also be motivated by the underinvestment problem.  
  
In this paper we seek to examine whether a substitutive relationship exists between hedging 
and cash management in firms with large investment opportunities. Also, we study if this 
relationship is strengthened in the presence of potential underinvestment problems. Even 
though cash holdings and hedging can theoretically be seen as substitutes, this does not imply 
that hedging firms should not hold cash reserves, but that the need for larger reserves is 
reduced.2 To the extent of our knowledge, this area has not been fully investigated. We 
expect that firms that hedge hold less cash, lower their cash holdings when they hedge and 
that this relationship is strengthened in the presence of potential underinvestment issues.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Potential Underinvestment Problems, Managerial Risk Aversion, Convex Tax Function and Costs of 
Financial Distress (Culp, 2001). 
2 We define cash holdings and hedging as alternative risk management tools in the manner that a decision 
to hedge may also influence a company’s need to hold cash reserves. However, we do not imply that 
hedgers do not need to hold cash reserves, and mean that a decision to hedge is also determined from other 
incentives and aspects than a company’s cash holdings.   
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1.2 Research Question 
In order to determine whether cash holdings are affected by hedging, and if cash holdings and 
hedging can be seen as alternatives in the presence of possible underinvestment problems, the 
following research question has been formulated: 
  
 
Does hedging reduce cash holdings for firms with substantial investment 
opportunities, and is this relationship strengthened by potential 
underinvestment problems? 
  
1.3 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to extend the scope of previous research and examine how firms with 
substantial capital needs manage risks. For firms with high growth opportunities and 
investment needs, access to capital is critical and the risk for underinvestment problems is 
increased. According to the theoretical framework, these firms will be more eager to engage 
in risk management activities. This study examines whether these firms’ decision to hedge 
also affects the amount of cash held by the firm. 
  
The study is based on previous research primarily surrounding the determinants of cash 
holdings, as well as the determinants of firms’ hedging policies. Gay and Nam (1998) 
analyzes the underinvestment problem as a determinant for corporate hedging decisions. 
They find that firms with low levels of cash, and high growth opportunities, are most exposed 
to underinvestment problems. Opler et al (1999) examine the determinants of cash holdings 
and find that firms with large growth opportunities hold relatively more cash. In later years, 
papers such as Marin and Niehaus (2011) and Bolton et al (2011) have studied the 
relationship between cash holdings and hedging for financially constrained firms.  
 
Marin and Niehaus (2011) argue that hedging and cash holdings can be seen as substitutes for 
financially constrained firms, and reason that in theory this should be applicable to 
unconstrained firms as well. Bolton et al (2011) propose that a firm’s optimal cash level 
cannot be explained by a target capital-ratio alone. Instead, optimal cash holdings need to be 
seen from a dynamic risk management perspective. They find that cash holdings and hedging 
activities act as complementary risk management tools. We aim to extend the scope of 
previous research by further examining the relationship between cash holdings and hedging, 
and include potential underinvestment problems, to find whether this strengthens the 
relationship. Also, we do not separate between financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms to see if the relationship holds regardless of financial health.  
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1.4 Scope and limitations 
We examine 90 US firms in the Biotech and Pharmaceuticals and the Medical Equipment and 
Devices industries listed on the S&P 1500, which includes small-, mid- and large cap firms.  
The study is conducted over the time period 2009-2013, giving a total sample of 450 firm 
years. These five years offer the most updated available figures at the time of our data 
collection and follows the recent financial crisis, a period that to our knowledge has not yet 
been researched. Furthermore, the study will be conducted on the US market since first, it is 
one of the largest healthcare sectors in the world, and second it is characterized by high 
growth firms (Donzon, 1992). This means that the results will be applicable primarily for 
firms operating in this area. Firms in other markets might manage their risks differently due 
to possible differences in regulations and in the economical environment. However, since the 
US is one of the world’s largest economies, results on this market are of global interest. 
  
1.5 Target group 
This paper is intended for researchers and students who have an interest in corporate finance, 
and in the relationship between a firm’s decision to hedge and its effect on cash management. 
Furthermore, our findings can be of interest for financial managers, management consultants, 
and investors who work or are interested in high growth and investment companies.   
  
1.6 Outline 
Chapter two includes a thorough presentation of the theoretical and empirical framework on 
which this thesis is built. The motives for risk management are described and empirical 
research on cash holding and hedging determinants is presented. Chapter three presents the 
methodological framework that supports this study. Further, we present and explain the 
choices of variables. Chapter four presents the final results while chapter five gives an 
extensive analysis of our findings. Finally, chapter six concludes this study and presents 
proposals for further research. 
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2. THEORIES AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The chapter outlines the relevant theories and gives a thorough review of previous empirical studies. We 
present the MM perfect capital market theory, which is followed by cash management theories and 
research. Then the relevant hedging theories and studies are presented. Finally, empirical evidence on 
cash management and hedging as alternative risk management tools is discussed.   
  
 
 
Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) irrelevance proposition from 1958 is the foundation for most 
economic theories. The irrelevance proposition states that under ideal capital markets,3 risk 
management activities will not contribute to value creation. 
 
However, market imperfections do occur and violate these assumptions. Disruption of the 
MM assumptions creates an opportunity to enhance shareholder value by engaging in 
corporate risk and cash management through different actions like derivatives hedging and 
excessive cash holdings. Hedging activities can reduce the volatility of firms’ cash flows, 
while holding additional cash may reduce the dependency of continual inflows of cash. Both 
ways can thereby reduce the variance in firm value. As a direct implication, the probability of 
a lower firm value decreases, and the costs stemming from capital market imperfections are 
also reduced (Bartram, 2000). As previously mentioned, risk and cash management serve the 
same purpose and can therefore be seen as substitutes (Culp, 2001).  
 
2.1 Cash Management Theory and Previous Research 
Keynes (1936) defines primarily two advantages from holding cash, the transaction cost 
motive and the precautionary motive. First, the transaction cost motive is based on short-term 
needs and explains the benefit of avoiding transaction costs when raising funds as well as not 
having to liquidate assets. Second, the precautionary motive relates to the value of using cash 
to finance investments in the future as well as other obligations the firm might have. The 
costs related to these motives include brokerage costs, insufficient investments from deficient 
liquidity and agency costs (Miller & Orr, 1966; Miller, 1977). The most relevant for our 
sample firms is holding cash as a motive to prevent potential underinvestment problems. The 
drawbacks of holding cash are a possible tax disadvantage, excessive managerial spending 
                                                 
3 •1. Perfect capital markets: No taxes, costs of financial distress, transaction costs or other institutional 
 frictions exist in the market  
   •2. Symmetric information: All market participants have equal access to information as well as identical 
 perceptions about how the information will impact asset prices  
   •3. Given investment strategies: Firms' investment programs are fixed and known to all investors, and 
 assumed to be independent of how firms choose to finance themselves  
   •4. Equal access to capital markets: Every market participant has exactly the same access to the financial 
 markets under the same terms 
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and a lower rate of return due to a liquidity premium (Opler et al, 1999; Harford, 1999). Also, 
a firm that holds large cash reserves increases the risk of being acquired.  
 
2.1.1 The Transaction Cost Model 
The trade-off theory of capital structure, introduced by Miller in 1977, explains how 
corporations usually are financed partially with debt and partially with equity. In the trade-off 
model the value of a company is maximized through the balance between costs and benefits 
associated with debt and equity financing. In order to attain an optimal capital structure that 
maximizes total market value, firms have to pursue debt levels that balance the value of 
interest tax shields to the various costs of bankruptcy or financial distress. Liquid assets can 
reduce the risk of financial distress, and thereby the costs associated with it (Keynes, 1936). 
Optimal cash holdings can be seen as an extension of the trade-off theory called the 
transaction cost model. An optimal level of cash increases company value when it is costly 
for firms to be short of cash. In figure 1 the transaction cost model shows the relationship 
between the marginal benefits and costs of holding cash. Firms set optimal targets based on a 
weighted balance between these two aspects. In optimum, the marginal benefits of holding 
cash equals the marginal costs of holding the cash. Managers have to define and evaluate the 
benefits of additional liquid assets to cutbacks of these assets (Opler et al, 1999).  
 
Figure 1 - The Transaction Cost Model 
 
 
 
Note: The transaction cost model shows the optimal holdings of liquid assets, which is given by 
the junction of the marginal cost of liquid asset shortage and the marginal cost of liquid assets 
curve. The marginal cost of liquid asset shortage is a declining curve, while the marginal cost of 
liquid assets is non-declining. 
 
Source: Opler et al. (1999) 
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The first empirical results for the trade-off theory and corporate cash holdings were presented 
by Kim, Mauer, and Sherman in 1998. They analyze the costs and benefits of corporate 
liquidity holdings by conducting a study of 915 US firms within industrials during the period 
from 1975 to 1994. Their findings are consistent with theory, and show that firms that 
experience volatile earnings face higher external financing costs. As a result, these firms hold 
a higher relative amount of liquid assets. Further, by measuring firms’ growth opportunities 
with market-to-book ratios, they find that firms with substantial growth options also have 
significantly higher cash holdings. The same study also shows a negative relationship 
between firm size and cash holdings, which is consistent with Opler et al.’s (1999) 
transaction costs model, and can be explained by the positive relation between firm size and 
access to capital markets. 
  
By examining a sample of 1048 US firms from 1971 to 1994, Opler et al. (1999) studied how 
firms actually change their cash holdings over time depending on growth opportunities, firm 
size, dividends, and capital expenditures. Besides presenting results consistent with Kim et al. 
(1998), they also measure firms’ credit quality by incorporating a form of Altman’s Z-Score. 
The results from this analysis showed, as anticipated, that firms with higher credit quality in 
general hold less liquid assets (Opler et al, 1999). This can be explained by their larger access 
to capital markets, which makes them less dependent on holding liquid assets. In a study 
from 2012, Gill examines ten factors motivated from theories related to working capital 
requirements, corporate governance and additional variables that were studied in previous 
empirical work. The results show that market-to-book ratio, net working capital, leverage, 
firm size, board size and CEO duality affect corporate cash holdings for manufacturing firms 
in the Canadian market. Also, the regulatory environment has been proven to have a strong 
impact on a firm’s cash holdings (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).  
  
2.1.2 The Precautionary motive and the Pecking Order Theory 
Information asymmetry between stakeholders may result in agency costs and can explain 
why firms hold excessive cash instead of an amount that maximizes shareholder value (Kim 
et al, 1998). Firms that do not hold liquid assets and experience cash flow shortfalls might 
avoid investing in positive NPV projects, and rather hold excess cash to prevent possible 
financial distress costs (Opler et al, 1999). This motive is also referred to as the precautionary 
motive for holding cash and is the most relevant motive for firms with large investment 
opportunities (Keynes, 1936; Marin & Niehaus, 2011). The discount outsiders require on 
securities due to lack of information may be so large that management might avoid issuing 
them, and rather choose to reduce investment activity. An example where this type of agency 
problem may occur is in R&D intensive firms. These firms often have unique projects, so 
management has to be careful with communicating details even to stakeholders. Also, these 
investments are often risky, have a low success rate and the firms are therefore expected to 
hold more liquid assets (Opler & Titman, 1994). 
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The pecking order theory seeks to explain an optimal financing strategy and takes on capital 
structure decisions by including the assumptions of asymmetrical information as a significant 
factor. As a consequence of asymmetrical information, companies follow a certain funding 
order when determining their financing decisions (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The basis of the 
pecking order theory is that firms prefer internal funds to external funds, and debt before 
equity, as this is the least expensive way of financing. The pecking order theory supports 
holding cash as external funding should be avoided. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) perform an 
empirical study and find that higher cash holdings allow constrained firms to invest in 
positive net investments that would otherwise be evaded. They also find evidence of 
financially constrained firms holding high levels of cash to avoid external financing. 
According to financial theory, firms with large investment opportunities should therefore 
hold a significant amount of cash. This notion has also been confirmed in several empirical 
papers (Nance et al, 1993; Kim et al, 1998; Opler et al, 1999). 
 
2.2 Hedging Theories and Previous Research  
The Keynesian hedging pressure theory (1930) states that the commodity futures market 
serves as insurance, and is always in backwardation4, which allows manufacturers to transfer 
risk for a risk premium. As risk reduction can increase firm value, this is the main motive for 
hedging (Allayannis and Weston, 2001). Other rationales for hedging have also been 
developed through the years including higher debt capacity, progressive tax rates, lower 
expected costs of financial distress, secured internal financing and reduced information 
asymmetries (Miller and Modigliani, 1963; Myers, and Majluf 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Froot et al, 1993). A disadvantage with hedging is the high costs of using derivatives without 
knowing if it will actually pay off (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al, 1993; Geczy, Minton, 
and Schrand, 1997).  
 
In 1993 Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein pointed out that risk management is crucial for 
primarily three reasons. Firstly, firm value can be created through investment in positive 
NPV projects. Secondly, internal generation of cash in order to fund these investments is an 
important key for firms to maintain high levels of investments. Firms that fail to generate 
sufficient cash flows tend to lower their investments below the optimal level because of 
costly external financing (Gay and Nam, 1998). Thirdly, external factors such as interest 
rates, commodity prices, or movements in exchange rates can all disrupt critical cash flows. 
Risk management can ensure that sufficient internal funds are available to make value-
enhancing investments (Froot et al, 1993). 
  
 
                                                 
4 Normal backwardation is a higher expected futures spot price than the current spot rate, and a futures 
contract is likely to generate a positive return in a long position. 
 [http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Backwardation Accessed 08.05.2015] 
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Variability in internal cash flow must result in either a variability of externally raised funds 
or a reduction in investments (Froot et al, 1993). The latter alternative may affect firm value 
by for example causing underinvestment problems and, along with expenses connected to 
raising external capital, firms are motivated to engage in risk management. Nance et al. 
(1993) and Geczy et al. (1997) find that capital-intensive firms are more likely to use 
derivatives, while firms with high levels of short-term liquidity are less likely to use 
derivatives.  
 
Froot et al. (1993) developed a framework for analyzing risks and implementing optimal 
hedging strategies for firms to coordinate between optimal levels of investment and financing 
policies. Their study showed that firms experiencing rising marginal costs of external 
financing should always choose to hedge their cash flows. In some cases, however, a 
company’s investment opportunities might change in the same manner as its operations and 
cash flows. This means that supply and demand for internal funds match, and the company 
will not have a reason to hedge. For such companies, engaging in hedging activities is less 
valuable (Froot et al, 1993). Accordingly, it is more valuable to hedge investment 
opportunities that are negatively correlated with the firm’s current cash flows. 
 
2.2.1 The Underinvestment problem  
The underinvestment problem is an agency issue in which a firm denies low-risk projects to 
increase own wealth at the cost of its creditors (Gay & Nam, 1998). As the low-risk 
investments only generate steady cash flows to creditors, but no profit to shareholders, 
companies avoid these investments even if they enhance overall firm value (Miller, 1977). 
The underinvestment problem often occurs when firms’ cash flows are negatively correlated 
with its investment opportunities, leading them to seek external financing. Firms mostly 
exposed to possible underinvestment problems are those with high growth opportunities and 
low levels of internal cash (Gay and Nam, 1998).  
 
In fear of underinvestment issues, creditors will demand higher interest rates or debt 
covenants. Risk management can mitigate these agency costs by decreasing the riskiness of 
projects. Firms that engage in risk management can therefore increase their debt levels 
without increasing the chance of encountering underinvestment costs (Bartram, 2000). Since 
information asymmetry increases the premium creditors take for their risk, capital-intensive 
firms have an incentive to hold more cash. Cash can therefore reduce agency costs that arise 
from external funding. Hedging serves the same purpose. By hedging, firms may reduce cash 
flow volatility and the need for external funding. Hedging can thereby mitigate potential 
underinvestment and cash flow problems (Morellec and Smith, 2007).     
 
The positive relationship between R&D and derivative usage is confirmed empirically by 
several studies conducted around the underinvestment hypothesis (Nance et al, 1993; Geczy 
et al, 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998). In contrast, another empirical research conducted by Mian 
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(1996) indicates the opposite. By using growth opportunities as a proxy for underinvestment 
issues, Mian finds a negative relationship between firms’ future investment opportunities and 
derivative usage, which contradicts the underinvestment hypothesis. A reason to these 
inconsistent results may be the constraints in accounting regulations on hedging of predicted 
exposures (Gay and Nam, 1998). However, a particular firm’s optimal hedging strategy 
depends not only on the internal financing strategy, but also on market competition as well as 
on the hedging strategies adopted by competitors (Froot et al, 1993).  
 
Gay and Nam (1998) build their work on Froot et al. (1993), and investigate hedging policies 
adopted by firms experiencing underinvestment problems. Consistent with prior results, Gay 
and Nam (1998) find a positive relation between growth opportunities and derivative usage. 
Their study was carried out around three main hypotheses developed from the 
underinvestment theory; (a) firms with greater investment or growth opportunities will make 
better use of derivatives, (b) firms with enhanced investment opportunities concurrent with 
low levels of cash stocks will make better use of derivatives than similar firms with high cash 
stocks, and (c) firms with a higher correlation between cash flows and investment expenses 
will use derivatives less. They find that some companies experience a positive correlation 
between their internal cash flows and their investment expenditures, which reminds of a 
potential natural hedge. Empirically, firms experiencing this correlation also hold smaller 
derivative positions. Finally their findings indicate a relationship between cash holdings and 
hedging with derivatives, namely that firms with enhanced investment opportunities use 
derivatives more when they hold less amounts of cash (Gay and Nam, 1998). Focusing on 
currency exposure in particular, Géczy et al. (1997) find similar results indicating that firms 
with great growth opportunities, but limited access to financing, are more likely to hedge 
against currency risk compared to companies with better access to funding.  
 
2.2.2 Other risk management theories  
Managers are often undiversified in their wealth and dependent on the performance of their 
firms. This makes them reluctant to take on risk and gives them an incentive to secure the 
firm’s future existence. As a result, managers engage in risk reducing activities at the expense 
of well-diversified investors, or in other words, the shareholders (Bartram, 2000). If 
managers instead are not allowed to reduce their risk exposure, risk aversion may cause them 
to underinvest (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Reluctance to risk may cause managers to reject 
positive NPV projects, which can be directly value destroying for the firm. Risk management 
can avoid this problem, and may result in a willingness to invest in riskier projects. However, 
holding excess cash may also lead to increased agency problems through excessive 
managerial spending. Harford (1999) as well as Dittmar and Thakor (2007) provide support 
for the view that high levels of cash may be value destroying, while Mikkelson and Partch 
(2003) reason that cash hoarding may in fact be essential to operations, and find no evidence 
that firms with higher cash holdings perform worse than firms with lower cash levels.  
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From a tax perspective, risk management is more efficient for firms with volatile income and 
a convex tax curve (Bartram, 2000). Firms that are subject to a convex tax scheme can reduce 
its tax liability through the use of derivatives for hedging purposes (Figure 2). For the convex 
tax scheme to exist, the firm must either be subject to a marginal tax rate that increases 
progressively with the size of pre-tax income, or it must be induced by tax regulations 
(Bartram, 2000).  
 
Figure 2 - Post-tax firm value from hedging activity 
 
 
 
Vj[Vk]:pre-tax value of the firm without hedging if state j[k] occurs.  
E(V): expected pre-tax value of the firm without hedging. 
E(T): expected corporate tax liability without hedging.  
E(T:H): corporate tax liability with a costless, perfect hedge.  
E(V-T): expected post-tax firm value without hedging. 
E(V-T:H): post-tax firm value with a costless, perfect hedge.  
C*: maximum cost of hedging where hedging is profitable. 
 
Note: The figure illustrates how costless hedging can reduce the variability of pre-tax firm value by 
reducing the expected taxes, resulting in a rise in expected post-tax firm value.  
 
Source: Smith & Stulz (1985)  
 
Firms’ tendency to engage in hedging based on tax incentives depends on the regulations 
where they operate. For US firms, Graham and Smith (1999) find that fifty per cent of all 
firms tend to face a convex effective tax function, a conclusion drawn from a study of more 
than 80,000 firm-year observations. However, they also find that the potential tax savings are 
neither equally distributed among all firms, nor do all firms have substantial tax-based 
incentives to hedge. Only in extreme cases can firms make significant savings, and tax-based 
hedging is not mutually exclusive from other hedging incentives.  Firms that do face a 
convex tax curve, and thereby potential tax benefits, have an incentive to hedge (Graham and 
Smith, 1999). Firms that do have an incentive to hedge for tax purposes should not hold high 
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levels of cash, as this increases the tax liability (Opler et al, 1999). This means that firms that 
hedge can get a tax benefit from avoiding high cash levels.  
 
Firms are financially distressed when they fail to meet their obligations towards creditors. 
Engaging in risk management activities may reduce the probability of costly default. This 
situation is mostly triggered by cash flow volatility, which may lead to insufficient access to 
liquid assets (Miller, 1977). Risk management can reduce the probability of financial distress 
costs by reducing the volatility in cash flows, and thereby the chance of defaulting on debt 
obligations (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Reducing the probability of financial distress through 
risk management will also let the firm take on additional leverage, which can increase the 
value of the tax shield. Previous research show mixed findings in regards to costs of financial 
distress and risk management. Graham and Rogers (2002) find that firms use financial 
derivatives to deal with the probability of financial distress costs, while Mian (1996) cannot 
find any evidence that supports such decisions. Larger cash levels can reduce the chance of 
defaulting on obligations through holding reserves (Smith & Stulz, 1985). Hedging on the 
other hand gives more stable cash flows, meaning that firms that hedge and have a risk of 
defaulting have an opportunity to hold less cash. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) argue that 
constrained firms with high levels of investments may hold low cash levels due to 
persistently low cash flows.  
 
2.3 Cash Management and Hedging as Substitutes  
Bolton et al. (2011) argue that cash management and derivatives hedging are complementary 
forms of risk management. The authors focus on financially constrained firms and aim to find 
a forceful corporate risk management framework that illustrates hedging policies, cash 
holdings, external financing, payout, and corporate investment for financially constrained 
firms (Figure 3). The framework is built on empirical results and emphasizes the importance 
of including the demand for capital when determining the level of cash holdings (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Froot et al, 1993; Graham and Smith, 1999).  A target cash-capital ratio is 
thereby too limited to explain individual firms’ desired cash levels (Bolton et al, 2011).  
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Figure 3 - Dynamic risk management 
 
Note: The dynamic risk management framework shows how cash management and financial hedging is 
interrelated. The figure also includes several firm aspects that affect cash management decisions.  
 
Source: Bolton et al  (2011) 
 
The pecking order theory is used to explain the relationship between cash management and 
hedging, which argues that firms prefer internal financing and avoid raising funds from 
outsiders. To mitigate this probability they can either hold more cash to use for investment 
purposes or hedge to secure steady cash flows, which reduces the need for costly cash 
holdings. While cash can help reduce residual risk5, derivatives hedging may limit systematic 
risk6 (Bolton et al, 2011). Comparable firms often have significantly dissimilar cash levels, 
which demonstrates that optimal cash holdings are determined by several factors (Opler et al, 
1999).  
  
Marin and Niehaus (2011) also examine the joint decision to use derivatives for hedging 
purposes and finding the right level of cash. With the purpose of exploring and examining 
possible interactions between alternative risk management tools, they focus on firms facing 
financial constraints. These firms face an increased level of uncertainty, so cash flows 
become particularly important. According to the theoretical framework, a connection 
between different risk management tools should be applicable to all firms regardless of their 
financial health (Marin and Niehaus, 2011). A drawback when considering only financially 
                                                 
5 “Any risk remaining to an investment after all other risks have been eliminated, hedged or otherwise 
accounted. Some residual risks may not be known during risk analysis, and indeed may not be knowable.”  
[http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Residual+Risk Accessed 08.05.2015.] 
6 “Risk caused by factors that affect the prices of virtually all securities, although in different proportions. 
Examples include changes in interest rates and consumer prices. Although it is not possible to eliminate 
systematic risk through diversification, it is possible to reduce it by acquiring securities.”  
[http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/systematic+risk Accessed 08.05.2015] 
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constrained firms is that the collateral costs associated with taking on a hedging position 
might impact the decision. The costs alone may limit severely constrained firms in their 
decision to hedge, which results in a stronger relationship between hedging and cash 
hoarding (Mello and Parsons, 2000).   
  
Table 1 on the follow page, presents the most relevant studies connected to this topic and 
their results. Previous research has proven that cash holdings and hedging may work as 
potential substitutes regarding uncertain future cash flows and costly external capital. 
Empirics also verify that corporate hedging decisions are taken in relation to firms’ 
accessibility to capital (Mello and Parsons, 2000; Marin and Niehaus, 2011). The results for 
unconstrained firms are however mixed. Depending on how financial constraints are defined, 
Marin and Niehaus (2011) indicate a positive sensitivity of hedging to cash holdings, while 
others find no relation at all for unconstrained firms (Bolton et al, 2011). Therefore we study 
if hedging affects cash holdings in high investment firms and if this relationship is stronger in 
the presence of potential underinvestment problems. This will be tested according to the 
methodology presented in the following chapter.  
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Table 1 - Results from previous research 
 
AUTHORS  
TIME 
PERIOD  METHODOLOGY  FINDINGS  
CASH HOLDING ARTICLES  
Kim et al. (1998)  1975-1974 Multivariate Regression  
Firms with volatile earnings hold more cash, 
while firm size is negatively correlated to 
liquid assets.  
Opler et al. (1999)  1971-1994 Multivariate Regression  
Evidence of a target adjusted cash holdings 
model. Also, firms with strong growth 
opportunities hold more cash.  
Harford (1999)  1977-1993 Multivariate Regression  
Firms may hold less cash to avoid excessive 
spending.  
Denis & Sibilkov 
(2010)  
1985-2006 Simultaneous Equation 
Financially constrained firms hold high cash 
levels to avoid external financing. Greater 
cash levels allow for higher levels of 
investments.  
Gill (2012)  2008-2010 Multivariate Regression  
Market-to-Book, Net Working Capital, 
Leverage, Size, Board size and CEO duality 
significantly affect corporate cash holdings.  
HEDGING ARTICLES  
Smith & Stulz (1985)  - Analysis of Financial Theory 
Taxes, Costs of financial distress and 
Managerial risk aversion motivates risk 
management.  
Froot et al. (1993)  -   Multivariate Regression  
Finds a benefit to hedging when external 
sources of finance are more costly to 
corporations than internally generated funds.  
Nance et al. (1993)  1986 Questionnaire Survey   
Firms that hedge have convex tax functions, 
high growth options, are lager and have fewer 
hedging substitutes.  
Mian (1996)  1992 Multivariate Regression  
Finds no relationship between hedging and 
costs of financial distress, and mixed results 
between tax and hedging.  
Getczy et al. (1997)  1990 Multivariate Regression  
Financially constrained firms with growth 
opportunities are likely to use derivatives.  
Gay & Nam (1998)  1995 Multivariate Regression  
Firms with low levels of cash, and high 
growth opportunities, are most exposed to 
underinvestment problems. 
Graham & Rogers 
(2002)  
1994-1995 Multivariate Regression  
Firms use derivatives to deal with the 
probability of financial distress.  
CASH HOLDING AND HEDGING  
Bolton et al. (2011)   -  Multivariate Regression  
Cash and Hedging can be seen as 
complementary risk management tools  
Marin & Niehaus 
(2011)  
1997-2004 Simultaneous Equation Cash and Hedging can be seen as 
complementary risk management tools  
Note: The table displays the most relevant previous research, their examined time period, methodology  
and main findings.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The chapter describes the methodological approach applied in this research. The sampling 
method and variables are described in detail, and an in-depth discussion regarding the 
econometric technique is presented.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Methodological approach  
The methodological approach applied in this study is based on previous research and relevant 
economic theories. A deductive approach is adopted to examine whether cash holdings and 
hedging are viewed as substitutive risk management tools (Jacobsen, 2002). Further, we 
implement a quantitative approach, as the objective is to analyze quantitative data and 
identify causal relationships between hedging activities and corporate cash holdings. We also 
examine this relationship for firms with potential underinvestment problems. A quantitative 
methodology is used since the study will be conducted and analyzed through regressions and 
hypothesis testing, which in turn relies on data measured and collected for a large sample of 
firms (Lundahl and Skärvad, 1999).  
 
Through the years, research based on a deductive approach has endured some criticism. One 
aspect that has been pointed out is the view that a deductive approach may be limiting and 
that the methodological approach itself carries an imminent risk of neglecting important 
information and data in the field of study (Jacobsen, 2002). To address these possible 
limitations, we rely on a thorough review of previous empirical research and base our study 
on existing theories. Further, we use acknowledged sources like Bloomberg, Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, and S&P Capital IQ, as well as annual reports to collect our data. In 
order to reduce the risk of selection bias, we include all relevant firms from S&P 1500 in our 
data sample. We do acknowledge that choosing a specific index may cause some selection 
bias. However, including all relevant firms from this index gives a better picture of the 
market than picking a random sample from the index.  
 
3.2 Reliability and Validity  
In economic research, it is important that the study fulfills the requirements of reliability and 
validity. Reliability refers to the extent a test yields the same results on repeated trials, and 
how much these results are influenced by errors like outliers and irregular data. Our result 
should, given high reliability, show the same results if the study was conducted twice 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). To increase the reliability of our study, we choose trustworthy 
sources for our data collection. As mentioned, we use recognized databases like Bloomberg, 
S&P Capital IQ, and Thomson Reuters Datastream to gather necessary data. The financial 
data collected from these sources is derived from each individual firm’s financial 
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information, meaning that the information has been approved by professional auditors. In 
cases where the information needed is not available in any of these databases, we collect the 
data directly from the companies’ annual reports. We therefore consider our sample data to 
be highly reliable. We are aware that the data, despite coming from reliable sources, may 
contain errors and therefore do our best to strengthen the reliability of our sample in several 
ways. First, we include a list of all the firms in our sample to increase the replicability 
(Appendix 1). Second, we choose a period of five firm years to minimize the irregularity of 
available information and to increase the scope of our data.  
 
Validity is also of great importance in financial research. Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that 
the validity of a research paper might be of even greater importance than the reliability, and 
describe it as how well the applied methodology measures what it is supposed to measure. 
According to Lundahl and Skärvad (1999), there are two forms of validity, namely internal 
and external validity. Internal validity is referred to as a causal relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable, meaning that a regressor explains some of the changes 
in the regressand. The variables we include in our study are well supported by previous 
research and we conduct causality tests to support this relationship. Therefore we believe that 
our study has a high internal validity. External validity concerns how well our research 
results can be generalized to other situations (Bryman and Bell, 2007). We believe that our 
sample represents the US biotech and pharmaceutical industry and the US medical devices 
and equipment market well. By including all companies in these industries included in S&P 
1500, we manage to represent all market capitalizations. We are aware that our results will 
denote the US market, but since this is one of the world’s largest economies our results are 
interesting from an international perspective as well.  
 
3.3 Sample and sampling method  
Our aim is to examine listed US firms within the biotech and pharmaceuticals, and the 
medical equipment and devices industries. In our index, 93 firms operate within these 
industries, but three are excluded since they are represented in more than one market 
capitalization during our time period. Only firms that are exposed to hedgeable risk are 
included in our sample.  
 
All market capitalizations are included since we believe there might be differences in the 
level of risk exposure depending on firm size, and in how the firms deal with this exposure. 
Some researchers that have conducted similar studies have chosen to exclude small firms, 
arguing that the fixed costs of initiating risk management programs outweighs possible 
benefits for these smaller firms (Géczy et al, 1997; Allayannis and Weston, 2001). However, 
due to the characteristics of our sample firms, we believe that small firms have an incentive 
to hedge. Also, we find small cap firms that hedge and therefore think it is relevant to include 
these firms. By covering the entire market we will get more dynamic results. We examine the 
period 2009-2013 since we want an up-to-date analysis, and a period that has not yet been 
  
 
 - 19 - 
 
researched. We do not include 2014 in our period as the annual reports for fiscal 2014 has not 
been released for all sample firms when we collect the relevant data.  
 
The final sample consists of 90 firms including 39 large cap, 16 mid cap and 35 small cap 
corporations, giving 450 firm years before data loss. Figure 4 provides the distribution 
between market capitalizations and industries, showing that firms from all categories are 
present in our final sample. A complete list of all companies included in our final sample is 
presented in Appendix 1. A further explanation of the impact this distribution can have on 
our results is found in section 4.1.  
 
Figure 4 - Distribution of Market Capitalizations and between industries 
 
  
Note: The figure shows the distribution between industries and market capitalization. The sample includes 
45 Biotech and Pharmaceutical and 45 Medical Equipment and Devices firms spread between large-, mid- 
and small-capitalizations. 39 firms are large-cap, 16 firms are mid-cap and 35 firms are small-cap.     
 
 
3.4 Econometric technique 
Identifying a correct model for our study is critical in order to get the right inference and 
consistent regression results. The model itself must meet statistical requirements and the 
variables included must correspond to the theoretical framework (Brooks, 2008). The 
empirical strategy of this research paper is to identify a consistent regression model, from 
which conclusions can be made about hedging activities’ impact on cash holdings.  
 
We expect corporate cash holdings to be a function of several factors;  
 
𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
25
14
7
9
13
22
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Bio &
Pharma
Medical
Dev.
Bio &
Pharma
Medical
Dev.
Bio &
Pharma
Medical
Dev.
Large Cap Mid Cap Small Cap
  
 
 - 20 - 
 
 
where hedging and underinvestment are our main variables of interest and the control 
variables include size, managerial risk aversion, access to capital markets, likelihood of 
financial distress, return on assets, and concave tax function. All variables will be further 
described in later sections. The subscripts indicate company i at time t. As in all econometric 
methods, unobservable factors that will not be possible to incorporate in a variable will be 
captured in an error term (Brooks, 2008). We present the models used to test our hypotheses 
later in the chapter.  
 
Our data consists of a time- and cross-sectional dimension of 450 observations. Since data is 
not available for all firm years, we have an unbalanced panel. In general two panel 
approaches are used in financial research, fixed effects model and random effects model. The 
fixed effects model allows for the intercept to differ cross-sectionally, but not over time, 
while the slope estimates are fixed in both dimensions (Brooks, 2008). We conduct a 
Hausman specification test for random effects to find out which approach is the most suitable 
for our sample, and conclude that random effects is not appropriate. We also conduct a 
redundant fixed effects likelihood ratio test, and find that pooled regression should not be 
used (Appendix 3). Therefore, we use fixed effects in the cross-sectional dimension when 
running the regressions. However, we have a homogenous sample within one country and 
only two industries with similar characteristics. This reduces the need for fixed effects. Our 
data also has very limited variation within firms, and we might therefore need variation 
between firms to capture significant results. Therefore, we also run pooled regressions to see 
if we get significant results.  
 
3.5 Definition of variables  
The chosen variables will strengthen our model when examining hedging activities’ effect on 
cash holdings. The objective when analyzing complex economical situations is to define a 
model that obtains a high degree of determination (Brooks, 2008). This section will provide a 
thorough examination of the variables included in our study, which are all used in previous 
studies of similar character (Kim et al, 1998; Opler et al, 1999; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; 
Graham and Rogers, 2002; Marin and Niehaus, 2011).  
 
3.5.1 Dependent Variables 
We use two measurements for firms’ cash holdings to define our dependent variables. The 
first variable is used to find out whether firms that hedge hold more or less cash compared to 
firms that do not hedge, while the other variable is made to check if firms change their cash 
holdings when they hedge. Since our sample includes small-, mid- and large-sized firms, the 
cash holdings in our dependent variable will be related to total assets. In section 4.1, 
Descriptive statistics, we find that the mean and median differ substantially for this variable, 
indicating a skewed sample. We therefore use the natural logarithm to make the CH variable 
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approximately linear, which is also consistent with previous research (Bolton et al, 2011). 
This regressand will be used in Model 1 and 2.  
  
𝐶𝐻 = ln (
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
) 
 
A consequence with the definition of the dependent variable that can disrupt the results is that 
cash holdings may suffer from a potential time lag. This means that there might be a time lag 
between the cash management decision process and its execution (Greene, 2002). Also, this 
variable measures specific cash levels at a certain point in time. In order to capture changes 
in cash levels, we define a second dependent variable, ΔCH, as follows:  
 
Δ𝐶𝐻 =  
(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
By also having the change in cash holdings for company i between time t-1 and t as a 
dependent variable, we manage to capture situations where firms choose to either increase or 
decrease their cash reserves. This variable is based on previous research by Almeida et al 
(2004) and Marin and Niehaus (2011), and will be used in Model 3 and 4.  
 
3.5.2 Main Descriptive Variables 
Explanatory variables explain the behavior of the dependent variable, and are included to 
strengthen the model (Brooks, 2008). Our main regressors are intended to measure firms’ 
hedging activities as well as possible underinvestment problems.  
 
Previous research often uses a binary variable as a proxy for hedging to define hedgers and 
non-hedgers (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Marin and Niehaus, 2011). A dummy variable is 
often used when it is not possible to measure or quantify the data of interest in a financial 
ratio (Weiers, 2011). The dummy variable takes on the value of one for firms that hedge and 
zero otherwise.  
 
𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒    𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1 
    𝑁𝑜 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 0  
 
 
The dummy variable equals one if a firm uses commodity derivatives, foreign currency 
derivatives or interest rate derivatives as well as swaps for hedging purposes, but not when 
they use it for speculative reasons. This information is collected from a thorough review of 
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annual reports7. Since our aim is to examine hedging in general we do not distinguish 
between different types of risk exposures. We expect DHedge to have a negative impact on 
cash holdings, since hedging reduces cash flow variability and should limit the need for 
holding excess cash (Kim et al, 1998; Bolton et al, 2011).  
 
For a firm to have an incentive to hedge based on fear of potential underinvestment problems, 
it must have access to positive NPV projects as well as an overhanging risk of insufficiently 
generating internal funds (Gay and Nam, 1998). Previous research has used investment 
opportunities as a proxy for underinvestment (Froot et al, 1993; Mian, 1996; Gay and Nam, 
1998). By using the sum of R&D expenses and capital expenditures, divided by total sales, 
we manage to capture a prediction of future opportunities. However, proxies often capture 
other effects than what is intended. The R&D variable might for example also capture agency 
problems, especially for poorly managed firms, since R&D expenses and the use of 
derivatives may be directly driven by for example excessive spending or risk aversion (Gay 
and Nam, 1998). Despite this possible problem, the variable is backed by previous research 
and can be used as an appropriate ratio for our sample firms. We use the natural logarithm to 
make the variable approximately normally distributed:  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝 = 𝑙𝑛 (
(𝑅&𝐷+𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) 
 
 
Some studies have used market-to-book and Tobin’s Q as proxies for investment 
opportunities. Market-to-book is used to measure the likelihood of firms having positive 
NPV projects. The book value captures the value of a firm’s assets, while the market value 
incorporates both growth opportunities and the assets in place (Gay and Nam, 1998). In later 
years, some researchers have also used Tobin’s Q as an alternative to measure firms’ 
investment opportunities. However, since we focus on industries with a high degree of R&D 
and capital expenditures, we believe our definition of InvOp to be the most appropriate proxy 
for underinvestment. Though, we also conduct a robustness check by using market-to-book 
(MtB) as an alternative proxy to see whether this changes our results. We expect a positive 
relationship between InvOp and our dependent variables CH and ΔCH, since firms want to 
invest in positive NPV projects without having to raise external capital (Froot et al, 1993; 
Gay and Nam, 1998; Morellec and Smith, 2007). Note that we use InvOp as a control 
variable for cash holdings, but that it is included in this section since it is used to build our 
next main variable, HedgeInvOp. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 We search the annual reports for the following words: hedge, hedging, derivatives, foreign exchange risk, 
currency risk, interest rate risk and commodity risk. We determine hedgers as firms that clearly state that 
they use derivatives for hedging, and not speculative purposes. 
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We also define a variable that captures the relationship between cash holdings and hedging in 
firms with large investment opportunities, which is our proxy for possible underinvestment 
problems. This variable is created by multiplying the previously presented variables InvOp 
and Dhedge.  
 
𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝 = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝 𝑥 𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 
 
We believe that the relationship between our dependent variable ΔCH and DHedge is 
strengthened in the presence of possible underinvestment issues. Earlier studies have 
examined financially constrained firms and find a significant relationship between cash 
holdings and hedging for these firms (Bolton et al, 2011; Marin & Niehaus, 2011), which is 
why we want to see whether the relationship is stronger in the presence of agency costs. All 
four risk management incentives could have been tested, but due to the nature of our firms, 
underinvestment is the most prominent factor to investigate. This variable has not been used 
in previous research. However, we find it the best way to measure this situation as it will 
capture firms that hedge and have possible underinvestment problems.  
 
3.5.3 Control Variables 
Multiple regressions take into account that the dependent variable is affected by more than 
one factor (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). We include several descriptive variables to better 
explain the movement of our dependent variables. However, since we do not know all the 
possible factors that affect our cash holding variables, the regressions will explain simplified 
situations (Brooks, 2008). 
 
We include a proxy for managerial risk aversion to account for one of the four risk 
management incentives. This variable should affect firms’ decision to engage in cash- and 
risk management activities. The variable is defined as follows:  
 
𝑀𝑅𝐴 =  
(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
 
The MRA variable is based on CEO stock ownership and share price, since this is directly 
tied to their wealth, and thereby describes their risk aversion (Gay and Nam, 1998). We 
believe that managerial risk aversion has a lagged time effect, and therefore take the stock 
ownership from the previous year. We predict a positive relationship between managerial risk 
aversion and our dependent variables since higher risk aversion should lead managers to hold 
more cash (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003).  
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Another way for risk management to create value is by reducing the likelihood of financial 
distress (Culp, 2001). Altman (1968; 2000) pointed out the five most relevant business 
aspects to rely on when calculating the risk of facing distress problems, and developed the Z-
Score. The Z-score variable is also used by other researchers (Kim et al, 1998).  
 
𝐿𝐹𝐷 = 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛′𝑠 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1.2 ∙ 𝑋1 + 1.4 ∙ 𝑋2 + 3.3 ∙ 𝑋3 + 0.6 ∙ 𝑋4 + 1.0 ∙ 𝑋5 
 
   where  
X1 = Working capital / Total assets 
X2 = Retained earnings / Total assets 
X3 = EBIT / Total assets 
X4 = Market value of equity / Book value of total liabilities 
X5 = Sales / Total assets 
 
 
The Z-score is calculated by including five standard ratio categories; measurements for 
liquidity, profitability, solvency, leverage, and activity ratios. The final function results in an 
index that proxies for likelihood of financial distress. Firms that experience operating losses 
will get a shrinking ratio. The importance of each ratio is measured by a scaled vector and 
ranked in order to identify betas for each ratio (Altman, 1968). A drawback of using the Z-
score analysis is that the probability of classifying younger firms as bankrupt is relatively 
higher compared to older firms. However, according to empirics younger firms face a higher 
likelihood of financial distress (Froot et al, 1993; Gay and Nam, 1998; Marin and Niehaus, 
2011). The Z-score is expected to have a positive relationship with our dependent variables, 
since firms that face a high probability of financial distress should prefer higher cash 
holdings to mitigate this risk (Opler et al, 1999).  
 
The last way for risk management to create value is by lowering expected taxes for firms 
with concave tax schedules. The advantage stems from reduced expected taxes by the use of 
derivatives, which limits the variability of taxable earnings. A convex tax schedule can result 
from the progressivity of the corporate income tax code, such as tax-loss carryforwards and 
foreign tax credits. Most public companies, as those in our sample, have pre-tax income 
above the progressive region, which arises the tax argument for risk management (Gay and 
Nam, 1998). We define our tax variable as net operating loss carryforwards divided by total 
assets:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
This way of measuring tax convexity is used by Gay and Nam (1998) and Graham and 
Rogers (2002). Some empirical studies outside the US use a leverage ratio as tax variable, 
since non-US firms usually have a concave tax function due to regulations and corporate 
taxation. These companies may increase their debt capacity and get additional tax shields, but 
cannot reduce their expected tax liability. US firms can on the other hand take advantage of 
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this opportunity, and we therefore have to control for this as well. Holding additional cash 
will increase the tax liability and we therefore expect a negative relationship between TAX 
and CH, as well as TAX and ΔCH  (Opler et al, 1999).  
 
Empirically, firm size has been proven to play an important role in determining corporate 
characteristics, including firms’ cash holdings. Firm size can be associated with economies of 
scale and a lower risk of default (Froot et al, 1993; Gay and Nam, 1998; Bolton et al, 2011; 
Marin and Niehaus, 2011). We define our size variable as the natural logarithm of total 
assets:   
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
 
Larger firms are likely to find alternative ways of risk management that are less costly than 
holding excessive levels of cash, indicating a negative relationship between cash holdings 
and SIZE (Opler et al, 1999; Bolton et al, 2011). However, Almeida et al (2004) and Denis 
and Sibilkov (2010) find that larger firms do hold more cash, which is in line with the 
pecking order theory. Reduced growth opportunities for these firms makes holding cash less 
expensive. But larger firms in general also have better access to capital markets, and thus a 
reduced need to hold excessive cash reserves (Opler et al, 1999). Due to the nature of our 
firms, we expect to find a negative relationship for SIZE, and we expect them to have large 
investment opportunities.  
 
Firm profitability is measured as net income in relation to total assets. Profitability might 
affect cash levels since the more profitable a company is, the less it needs to hold liquid 
assets as risk assurance. Our sample includes firms in two comparable industries with similar 
characteristics. However, we include small-, mid-, and large cap, so there might be 
significant differences between these categories. Since our firms are expected to have large 
investment opportunities and are supposed to use cash to create additional value, we expect 
ROA to have a negative relationship with CH and ΔCH.  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Our last control variable is a dummy variable that proxies for access to capital markets (Kim 
et al, 1998; Opler et al, 1999). When distributing dividends, firms are expected to have a 
better access to capital markets. The dummy takes on the value of one when firms pay out 
dividends to investors, and zero otherwise. We expect firms that distribute dividends to hold 
less cash, since they are less dependent on internal access to cash. The variables should 
therefore have a negative relationship with our dependent variables.  
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠   𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 = 1 
    𝑁𝑜 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 = 0  
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An overview of each independent variable’s expected causal impact on cash holdings is 
presented in table 2.   
 
Other variables have been motivated as determinants of cash holdings. Some of these, like 
net working capital and leverage, are incorporated in our Z-Score and we do therefore not 
include them as individual variables in our regressions. Others, like country regulations, are 
not relevant for us since we only focus on the US and do not compare results between 
nations. We believe that the chosen variables will provide valid results for our research 
question.  
 
Table 2 - Expected impact on cash holdings 
 
Variable  Expected Impact  
DHedge  - 
InvOp + 
HedgeInvOp - 
MRA + 
LFD + 
TAX - 
SIZE - 
ROA - 
DDividend  - 
Note: The figure shows how our independent variables are expected to affect cash holdings. The 
expected impact is based on theory and results from previous empirical studies, and adjusted 
according to our sample firms. 
3.6 Endogeneity  
A common problem in economic research is endogeneity issues, which is defined as 
correlation between at least one of the independent variables and the error term (Wooldridge, 
2010). A regression with an endogenous variable on the right-hand-side gives rise to bias and 
estimation error, and thus inconsistent parameter estimates (Angrist, 2008). In the presence of 
endogeneity issues, estimating a regression with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will not be 
the best estimator of betas, as the fourth OLS assumption will be violated (explained in 
section 3.7). Instead, a simultaneous equation system must be used to deal with these issues 
(Greene, 2002).  
 
There are three main causes of endogeneity. First, omitted variables are explanatory variables 
that are left out of a model because they are unobservable or difficult to proxy. Thus, they 
end up in the error term. Endogeneity problems arise if these variables are correlated with 
any of the independent variables. Since we have panel data, the use of fixed effects 
automatically takes care of this problem by the nature of the cross-sectional dimension 
(Greene, 2002). Second, some variables need to be proxied as they are difficult to quantify. 
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Conceptual dispersions occur between the proxies and their unobserved equivalents, giving 
rise to measurement error. These dispersions end up in the error term and may cause biased 
estimates. Measurement error is not a problem if the goal is to show correlation between a 
proxy and an observable measure (Wooldridge, 2010). Our goal is to make general 
conclusions about cash holdings so this problem might occur in our proxy for 
underinvestment. However, our proxy has been argued for in previous research and should 
therefore be a strong indicator of underinvestment (Gay and Nam, 1998). Third, reverse 
causality means that the dependent variable is affected by the explanatory variables, and  that 
one or some of the explanatory variables are also affected by the dependent variable. Since 
cash holdings and hedging are explained by several empirical studies as substitute risk 
management tools, we suspect that our model might suffer from simultaneity issues (Nance et 
al, 1993; Bolton et al, 2011; Marin and Niehaus, 2011). 
 
Since omitted variables and measurement errors are already accounted for in our model, we 
only test for reverse causality. Hedging and cash holdings can theoretically be seen as 
alternative risk management tools, which imply a possible reverse causality issue (Marin and 
Niehaus, 2011). Investments and cash holdings may also be affected by endogeneity 
problems since cash might determine how much a firm can invest in projects with internal 
funds. However, investment opportunities should not be affected by simultaneity problems 
since cash holdings do not affect the investment opportunities a firm has, only whether the 
firm actually can pursue the projects. Therefore, we do not find it necessary to test for reverse 
causality between cash holdings and investment opportunities.  
 
3.6.1 Instrumental variables  
We conduct a Hausman test to test for possible simultaneity issues. To do so we identify 
instrumental variables (IVs) for our predicted endogenous variable. An important factor 
regarding IVs is that the instruments have to be relevant, which means that they must be able 
to explain variation in the endogenous variable significantly. A valid IV is also correlated 
with the endogenous variable, but not with the error term. The IV can never affect the 
dependent variable directly, only indirectly through the endogenous variable. Relevance and 
direct correlation can be tested, but since the error term is unobservable we have to rely on 
economic theory and logical reasoning for assessing exogeneity (Greene, 2002).   
 
Roberts and Whited (2012) argue against the use of IVs, claiming that good IVs are next to 
impossible to find. Since the instrument’s exogeneity cannot be tested, the IVs must be based 
on thorough economic justification. Further, often more than one regressor is endogenous, 
meaning that inference can be compromised if instruments for all these variables cannot be 
found. Also, IVs encounter a tradeoff between internal and external validity. This means that 
if the IV takes care of the endogeneity problem, the results may only be applicable to our 
sample.  
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Marin and Niehaus (2011) use two variables as instruments for hedging, and argue that these 
instruments proxy CEO compensation. The proxies are based on stock options and restricted 
stock owned by CEO, and they state that: “Stock options awarded to the CEO, because of 
their convex payoff structure, can lead to risk taking, and thus a lower likelihood of hedging. 
Restricted stock, on the other hand, gives a CEO an incentive to reduce risk through 
hedging.” (pp. 14). They mean that these IVs identify a firm’s hedging activity without 
directly affecting cash holdings. However, we argue that there is a strong relationship 
between managerial risk aversion, based on stocks held by CEO, and cash holdings. This 
means that instruments’ exogeneity condition is not fulfilled for these IVs. There is however 
limited research on the relationship between cash holdings and hedging, which builds on the 
difficulties in finding valid IVs. Despite a thorough review of previous research, we have not 
been able to identify a valid IV for hedging. Difficulties in finding good IVs can be explained 
by the implications described in Roberts and Whited (2012). Since we cannot find better IVs 
for hedging, we find it appropriate to test the relevance of the IVs supported by Marin and 
Niehaus (2011) to be able clarify possible simultaneity issues. This will be done in a 
simultaneous equation system:  
 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛:  
𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 
𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 
We choose the stock option variable as an IV to perform a Hausman test for endogeneity, and 
test the relevance of the instrument by regressing the residuals from the reduced form 
equation in our structural equation (Appendix 2). The IV fulfills the relevance criteria and a 
Hausman test is conducted to find whether the theoretical expectations regarding simultaneity 
apply. We adjust our data as cross-sectional and perform a Hausman test with 2SLS, based 
on Greene (2002). The J-statistics from this test is insignificant which means that the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected. We are therefore not able to confirm any reverse 
causality issues. The results from the 2SLS and the Hausman test are also presented in 
Appendix 2. However, we understand that the results indicating no endogeneity is based on a 
bad IV, and realize how this might affect the results.  
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Even though the relevance criterias fulfilled and the IV is based on previous research, we 
cannot find a well-grounded argument for the instrument’s exogeneity condition. This means 
that we are not able to determine whether the results of no endogeneity from the Hausman 
test holds. For this reason, as well as Roberts and Whited’s (2012) arguments against IVs, we 
choose not to use a simultaneous equation system to test our hypotheses. Since we cannot 
find evidence of endogeneity our models are estimated in a multiple regression analysis using 
OLS, provided that the other underlying assumptions hold.  
 
3.7 Ordinary Least Squares  
OLS is the mostly used model in econometrics, and is applied to examine the linearity of the 
dependent and explanatory variables in a regression analysis. For OLS to be the best model 
for our sample and be BLUE8, the regression needs to fulfill five important criterias9. If these 
assumptions are not violated we can consider our models to be reliable and consistent.  
 
The first OLS assumption implicates that the average of the expected errors is zero. By 
including a constant this assumption is automatically fulfilled. The second requirement refers 
to the assumption of homoscedasticity. This implies that the variance among the residuals in 
a regression model should be constant. We test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity using 
White’s heteroscedasticity test, which shows that we have heteroscedasticity in our sample. 
We correct for this by using White’s diagonal robust standard errors (Brooks, 2008).  
 
The third assumption regards non-autocorrelation, which means that the errors are assumed 
to be uncorrelated with a covariance of zero both in the cross-sectional- and time dimension. 
Testing for autocorrelation is most relevant for time-series data, and is rarely tested for panel 
data. Our sample period is also relatively short, which makes it difficult to observe trends 
over time. We therefore do not conduct any extensive tests for this potential issue. However, 
we test this assumption with the Durbin-Watson test for robustness. Durbin-Watson statistic 
takes on values between 0 and 4, where 2 is desirable and indicates no autocorrelation 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2010). Our regressions have a Durbin-Watson statistic close to 2, and 
should thereby not suffer from autocorrelation problems. The fourth assumption states that 
the descriptive variables have to be non-stochastic, which implies that they are not correlated 
with the error term. If any of the independent variables are correlated with the error term, the 
                                                 
8 Best Linear Unbiased Estimator 
“The term best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) comes from application of the general notion of unbiased 
and efficient estimation in the context of linear estimation.”  
[http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-encyclopedia-of-social-science-research-methods/n56.xml 
Accessed 11-05-2015] 
9 1. The average values of the errors are zero. 
  2. The variance of the errors is constant.  
  3. The covariance between the errors is zero.  
  4. The regressors are uncorrelated with the error term.  
  5. The errors are normally distributed.  
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OLS estimator will be inconsistent and thus the regression will give biased results. These 
issues are referred to as endogeneity problems and are accounted for in earlier sections.  
 
The last assumption refers to the normality of the disturbance terms and is tested with a 
Jarque-Bera Normality test. We find no evidence of normally distributed errors. However, 
since all the other assumptions are fulfilled, and our sample consists of a large number of 
observations, economic literature argues that this assumption is negligible (Brooks, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2010). Besides the five OLS assumptions, we also check for multicollinearity 
among the independent variables. This is done in a correlation matrix (Brooks, 2008). None 
of the variables have a correlation exceeding 0.6, and therefore we find no evidence of 
multicollinearity (Appendix 3). Altogether, the test results indicate a stable and correctly 
specified model.   
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3.8 Regressions and Hypotheses  
The econometric technique as well as the variables included in the models are presented and 
described above. The regressions we run to conduct the study are presented below.  
 
 
𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    Model 1 
 
𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝 + 𝜙𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 Model 2 
 
Δ𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    Model 3 
 
Δ𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝 + 𝜙𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 Model 4 
 
Where:  
 
𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡    Level of Cash Holdings for firm i at time t   
Δ𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡    Change in cash holdings for firm i between time t-1 and t 
𝐷𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡    Dummy variable for hedging activity for firm i at time t 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑡  Investment opportunities for firm i at time t 
𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂𝑝  Interaction between hedging and investment opportunities for firm i at  
  time t 
𝜙𝐾𝑖𝑡   A set of control variables which are discussed above, including MRA,  
   SIZE, TAX, LFD, ROA, DDividend, and a vector of coefficients   
𝜀𝑖𝑡  Unobservable error term  
𝛼0, 𝛾0  The intercept  
 𝛼𝐾, 𝛾𝐾  The Coefficients  
 
3.8.1 Robustness Test  
We also conduct a robustness test to see whether our results are applicable also when using 
another variable specification for investment opportunities. Market-to-Book, MtB, is used to 
test if the results concerning firms’ investment opportunities effect on cash holdings still 
apply when using a different proxy. The test shows that we get significant results between 
cash holdings and hedging for firms with high investment opportunities, also when we use a 
different proxy. This means that our results are not dependent on the choice of variable. The 
results from the robustness tests are presented in Appendix 5.  
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3.8.2 Specification of Hypotheses  
To study the causal relationship between hedging and cash holdings, two hypotheses are 
developed. By running our regressions, we are able to answer the research question of 
whether or not hedging and cash holdings statistically can be viewed as alternative risk 
management tools, as well as if this connection is strengthened for firms with potential 
underinvestment problems. The hypothesis testing is performed at a 10 % significance level. 
 
The first hypothesis intends to capture differences in firms’ cash levels based on whether the 
firms hedge or not, and is formulated as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 1 ( HCH): Firms that hedge hold less cash compared to firms that do not hedge. 
  
This hypothesis is tested with Model 1 and 2. We test the relationship between hedging and 
cash holding levels both with and without potential underinvestment problems, since the 
relationship might be strengthened in the presence of increased investment opportunities. If 
the coefficient for DHedge in the first model is negative and significant, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Also, in Model 2 the null is rejected if the coefficient for HedgeInvOp is negative and 
significant.      
 
The next hypothesis is conducted to capture any changes in cash levels given that the firm 
hedges. We test whether it is statistically significant that a firm that hedges decrease their 
cash holdings. The hypothesis is stated as:   
 
Hypothesis 2 (HΔCH): Firms decrease their cash levels when they hedge. 
 
We use Model 3 and 4 to test HΔCH. The relationship between hedging and cash holdings is 
tested both with and without potential underinvestment problems. A negative and significant 
coefficient for the DHedge variable in Model 3 rejects the null, implying that a negative 
relationship between hedging and changes in cash levels occur. In Model 4, the null is also 
rejected if HedgeInvOp is negative and significant, implying that the relationship also exists 
under an increased risk of underinvestment problems.  
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3.9 Interpretation of Regression Results 
The coefficient of determination (R2) specifies the ratio of the variation in the dependent 
variables that is explained by the regressors (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). Many elements 
explain the level of cash a firm decides to hold, and cash holdings can therefore not be 
explained by hedging and investment opportunities alone. We believe that our models are 
well specified, since we have controlled for aspects with substantial impact on cash holdings. 
The R2 will reflect “cross-sectional values” of the data, meaning that we will be able to 
compare a firm’s risk management decision within our time period in the regressions with 
fixed effects specification (Greene, 2002). 
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4. RESULTS  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This chapter presents the results from the regressions, descriptive statistics of our sample and examines the 
hypotheses stated in the methodology chapter. Also, the model fit will be presented.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics   
The final sample consists of 406 observations, due to data loss from missing values. 
Descriptive statistics for the entire sample is presented in table 3. To emphasize the 
difference among the sample firm years, we will also present the descriptive statistics for 
each market capitalization (Appendix 4).  
 
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics for all sample firms 
Ratio Mean Median Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
Hedging Dummy  0.614 1 0.49 0 1 
Cash/Total Assets 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.001 4.11 
Total Assets  11,380 1,764 28,044 7.4 212,949 
Total Sales  7,538 1,343 18,430 1.40 122,734 
Market Value of Equity  15,226 2,915 32,683 89.4 212,543 
Return on Asset  0.0077 0.07 0.07 (0.32) 0.70 
Dividend Dummy  0.38 0 0.486 0 1 
R&D 655.9 77.55 1,593.2 0.0 9,340 
R&D/Sales  0.316 0.0812 1.641 0.0 21.67 
Note: The table displays the mean, median and standard deviations of all sample firms for important firm 
aspects. The numbers are in million dollars and contain values from 406 observations. 
 
The total sample presents a comprehensive dispersion among the variables and firm 
characteristics. In the entire sample, 61% of the firms use derivatives to hedge their risk 
exposure. If we look at the cash ratio we can see that some firms hold substantial amounts of 
liquid assets, while others do not hold much cash. However, the average is 17% for the 
sample as a whole. Firms that hedge hold on average less cash than firms that do not hedge, 
which is significant at 1% level. Moreover, hedgers hold on average 0.13 cash to total assets, 
while non-hedgers hold 0.23. There are also large differences in terms of total assets and total 
sales. The minimum shows a market value of equity of $89.4 million, while the maximum 
shows $212,543 million. 
 
Looking at return on assets, profitability varies among the firms. The mean and the median 
indicate that firms on average show profitable figures. 38% of the firms pay out dividends to 
its investors. R&D expenditures varies from 0 to more than 21 times the sales of the 
company. On average firms in the total sample spend 31.6% of their sales on R&D, which is 
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higher than the median. This indicates skewness in the sample and a great variety among the 
expenditures, which might affect the final results of the models.  
 
We also conduct descriptive statistics for each market capitalization to find possible 
differences (Appendix 4). Large firms hedge more than the average firm. As many as 86% of 
the large cap firms in our sample use derivatives, while mid cap (66%) and small cap (34%) 
firms hedge less. Large cap firms do however hold less cash compared to the other 
capitalizations, which is consistent with our expectations. Category statistics show that large 
firms that hedge hold 12% cash while firms that do not hedge hold 19%. Mid cap firms that 
hedge also hold less cash than non-hedgers with 13% and 23%, respectively. These results 
are significant at a 1% level. The same relationship is suggested for small cap firms, however 
these results are not significant.  
 
Further, a majority of the large cap firms pay out dividends, and large firms spend more 
money on R&D compared to the average firm. Fewer mid cap firms distribute dividends to 
its investors, and they also invest less in R&D. However, we see that the maximum value 
corresponds to R&D investments equal to 38% of sales, which indicates that mid cap firms 
do invest in R&D to the same extent as the average R&D expenditure. Small cap firms 
experience the most volatile profits and very few pay out dividends. On average they spend 
30% on R&D, however a low median indicates skewness in the sample, suggesting that some 
firms spend much more than others.  
 
4.2 Regression results  
The results of our regressions are presented in Table 4. The first column presents each 
variable included in the regressions, while the following columns provide the results of each 
regression separately. The first figures show the variable coefficients with asterisks indicating 
the level of significance, where one, two and three asterisks provide a significance level of 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses provide standard errors, corrected 
for heteroscedasticity using White diagonal standard errors.  
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Table 4 - Regression results 
 
  CH ΔCH 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed 
Intercept  -2.5703***  -1.9514  -2.3948***  -2.2415* 0.2605***  1.8309*** 0.1409  1.5958*** 
  (0.2930) (1.2081) (0.2848) (1.2204) (0.0819) (0.5048) (0.0968) (0.4979) 
DHedge  -0.5376*** 0.1157  -0.7518*** 0.2049  -0.0841**  -0.0204 0.0416 0.1087 
  (0.1298) (0.1618) (0.1347) (0.1740) (0.0345) (0.0512) (0.0373) (0.1028) 
InvOp  0.0453**  -0.0133 0.0397**  -0.0106  -0.0092  -0.0195  -0.0040  -0.0187 
  (0.0189) (0.0386) (0.0176) (0.0386) (0.0068) (0.0293) (0.0062) (0.0292) 
TAX 0.0946*** 0.0378  -0.1019 0.0995**  -0.1918***  -0.2460***  -0.0718**  -0.1734*** 
  (0.0160) (0.0236) (0.0573) (0.0473) (0.0192) (0.0165) (0.0361) (0.0481) 
LFD 0.0224*** 0.0189* 0.0243*** 0.0197* 0.0049*  -0.0065 0.0044  -0.0057 
  (0.0067) (0.0109) (0.0071) (0.0108) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0029) (0.0068) 
MRA 0.7353  -5.6512***  -0.0127  -5.6219***  -1.1961***  -1.7820**  -0.7188**  -1.801** 
  (1.2554) (1.7637) (1.2144) (1.7375) (0.3093) (0.7649) (0.3125) (0.7247) 
DDividend  -0.1503 0.1901  -0.1226 0.1797  -0.0557*** 0.0241  -0.0704*** 0.0202 
  (0.1162) (0.1507) (0.1161) (0.1497) (0.0195) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0358) 
SIZE 0.0440  -0.0692 0.0360  -0.0374  -0.0103  -0.2195***  -0.0034  -0.1971*** 
  (0.0404) (0.1583) (0.0393) (0.1599) (0.0084) (0.0665) (0.0101) (0.0649) 
ROA   3.5102***  1.3767  2.9099***  1.4576  0.6955**  -0.0744  -0.4160  -0.1143 
  (0.9963) (1.1133) (1.0332) (1.0734) (0.2892) (0.3889) (0.3250) (0.3682) 
HedgeInvOp  -   -  -1.0141***  -0.2987*  -   -  -0.6105***  -0.3462* 
   -  - (0.2613) (0.1988)  -  - (0.1787) (0.2129) 
R2 0.2061 0.8193 0.2369 0.8198 0.7536 0.8854 0.7882 0.8874 
F-
Statistics 11.259 12.592 11.935 12.458 107.45 16.031 115.79 16.101 
Firm 
Years  356 356 356 356 290 290 290 290 
Note: The results provided in the table are from the panel data sample of firm years between 2009-2013. For 
all models, results are presented from both pooled and fixed effects regressions. The first numbers are the 
regression coefficients, while figures in parentheses show the White’s standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The asterisks indicate the level of significance, where *, **, and *** stands for 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level respectively. The models R2 and F-statistics are also presented. Any variable with 
missing data is excluded from the regressions, which explains the variation in firm-years. 
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4.2.1 Hypothesis testing  
Hypothesis HCH 
The models in table 4 are used to test our hypotheses. The first hypothesis, HCH, suggests that 
firms that hedge hold less cash than firms that do not use derivatives. The null hypothesis 
states that firms are indifferent to their cash holdings following their hedging strategies. The 
pooled regression in Model 1 shows that the DHedge variable has a significant negative impact 
on cash holdings, which is consistent with our expectations. This means that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at a 1% level based on the pooled regression, but not when we 
control for fixed effects.  
 
This negative relationship also applies when running Model 2 as a pooled regression. 
HedgeInvOp suggests a stronger negative relationship, showing that hedging firms with large 
investment opportunities hold less cash than firms without these opportunities. This result is 
significant both in pooled and fixed effects regressions. According to the results in Model 1 
and 2, we reject the null hypothesis and find that hedgers hold lower cash reserves.  
 
Hypothesis HΔCH 
The second hypothesis, HΔCH, states that firms that hedge reduce their cash levels. In Model 
3, DHedge is significant in the pooled regression and indicates that hedgers reduce their cash 
levels by 8.41% compared to non-hedgers. The null is rejected at a 5% level based on the 
pooled regression. However, this is not confirmed when controlling for cross-sectional fixed 
effects. Model 4 shows that hedgers with high investment opportunities reduce their cash 
levels. This is significant for the HedgeInvOp variable both in pooled and fixed effects at a 1% 
and 10% level, respectively. This means that the null can be rejected regardless of 
specification.  
 
Table 5 provides the results from the hypotheses tests. The null can be rejected by Model 2 
and 4 when we use both pooled regressions and cross-sectional fixed effects, since HedgeInvOp 
has negative and significant coefficients. In Model 1 and 3, the null can be rejected by the 
pooled regressions, while controlling for fixed effects give insignificant results for the 
hedging variable DHedge.  
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Table 5 - Results of hypothesis tests  
 
HCH 
Model 1 Model 2 
Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed 
H0 Rejected Not Rejected Rejected Rejected 
DHedge  0.0024 0.2082  -  - 
HedgeInvOp  -  - 0.0001 0.0671 
  
    
HΔCH 
Model 3 Model 4 
Pooled Fixed Pooled Fixed 
H0 Rejected Not Rejected Rejected Rejected 
DHedge  0.0155 0.6903  -  - 
HedgeInvOp  -  - 0.0007 0.0477 
Note: The figures in the table present the p-values of the main independent variables. If respective values 
fall below the significance level of 10 %, each model’s null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.2.2 Control Variables  
The variable InvOp is positive and significant at a 5% level in the pooled regressions for 
Model 1 and 2. This means that as firms’ investment opportunities increase, they hold more 
cash. This statement does not hold when controlling for fixed effects. Also, in Model 1 and 2 
the LFD variable for likelihood of financial distress is significant both in the pooled 
regressions, and when controlling for fixed effects. This indicates that firms with a likelihood 
of default hold more cash. LFD is also significant in the pooled regression in model 3, stating 
that firms with a higher likelihood to default increases their cash reserves. The TAX variable 
has a significant and positive coefficient in Model 1 and 2, with CH as the dependent 
variable, suggesting that firms hold more cash when they have a tax advantage. However, in 
Model 3 and 4, the TAX variable has a significant negative coefficient. These results imply 
that firms with a tax advantage hold higher levels of cash, but decrease their cash holdings 
when they have a tax benefit.  
 
All models, except for the pooled regressions with CH as dependent variable, show a 
significant and negative relationship for MRA. This suggests that firms hold less cash as well 
as decrease their cash holdings when managers might be risk-averse. The SIZE variable has 
negative coefficients in all models, but is only significant when controlling for fixed effects 
in the third and fourth models. This indicates that as firm size increases corporations lower 
their cash holdings, which is consistent with our expectations. The pooled regressions in 
model 3 and 4 show negative coefficients for DDividend, meaning that firms that give out 
dividends reduce their cash reserves. Finally, ROA is positive and significant in all pooled 
specifications except for model 4, indicating that profitable firms hold more cash and 
increase their cash levels.  
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4.2.3 Model-fit  
The model fit is estimated by the coefficient of determination - R2. Model 1 and 2 show a 
model fit of around 0.20 for the pooled regressions (table 4). The rest of the models show a 
high model fit, meaning that a high percentage of firms’ cash holding decisions can be 
explained by hedging and the other variables included in the regressions. We expect a high 
model fit as we only have two industries in our sample, whose characteristics fit theoretically 
well with our chosen variables (Opler and Titman, 1994; Gay and Nam, 1998; Kim et al, 
1998; Opler et al, 1999; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Gill, 2012). However, since we cannot 
include all factors that have an effect on the dependent variables, we do not expect a perfect 
fit that can fully explain firms’ cash management decisions. The F-statistic is significant at a 
1% level in all the regressions, indicating a strong relationship between the dependent 
variables and all of the independent variables in the regressions.   
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5. ANALYSIS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The chapter includes a thorough analysis of the results of our regressions and hypothesis tests, based on 
the theoretical and empirical framework presented in Chapter 2. We begin discussing the descriptive 
statistics, then our variables and last some limitations of our study.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Descriptive results 
The descriptive statistics presented in table 3 show that 61% of our sample firms hedge. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) studied large US firms with currency risk exposure between 
1990-1995 and found that 37% of the firms hedged their risks. This indicates that hedging 
has grown in popularity in later years, which can be a result of a more globalized marketplace 
and thus increased risk exposure. However, this can also be due to differences among the 
sample firms. In our study we only include two industries, while Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) focus on all non-financial firms. Marin and Niehaus (2011) found that around 50.3% 
of their sample firms hedged while only focusing on manufacturing firms. This supports the 
motivation that firms hedge to different extents depending on industry, and R&D firms are 
likely to have a lot to gain from using derivatives.  
 
According to our descriptive results, larger firms also hedge to a higher extent than smaller 
firms. This might be explained by the costs associated with initiating a risk management 
program (Mello and Parsons, 2000). Smaller firms might choose not to hedge and rather 
pursue investments if they cannot afford to do both. Including small firms in our sample 
might therefore distort our results, since even if they have potential benefits from hedging, 
the firms might still avoid using derivatives. From the category statistics, we also see that 
hedgers hold significantly less cash. This is consistent with our expectations and with 
findings in previous research (Bolton et al, 2011).  
 
5.2 Cash Holdings and Hedging  
Our research question aims to define whether cash holdings and hedging can be seen as 
substitute risk management tools. To answer this question we conduct four regressions to test 
how hedging affects the level of cash a firm holds, whether hedgers reduces their cash levels, 
and if cash holdings and hedging have a strengthened negative relationship in the presence of 
potential underinvestment issues.  
 
The redundant fixed effects likelihood ratio test justifies the use of fixed effects in the cross-
sectional dimension, meaning that fixed effects is the best statistical specification for our 
models. Model 1 explains the determinants of firms’ cash holdings, and cannot provide any 
significant evidence that supports cash holdings and hedging as alternative risk management 
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tools when using fixed effects. This is inconsistent with previous research, (Marin and 
Niehaus, 2011). The fixed effects regression gives no significant results in Model 3 either, 
which seeks to explain the connection closer by examining if hedgers decrease their cash 
holdings. The lack of significant results might have multiple explanations.  
 
First, we examine financially unconstrained firms, while previous research has focused on 
constrained companies. As argued, the higher level of uncertainty makes risk management 
more important for these firms, and the relationship might be strengthened since they cannot 
afford to hold excessive levels of cash. The substitutive relationship may thereby be stronger 
for constrained firms. Financially unconstrained firms may not have to choose between cash 
hoarding and hedging. Due to a stable financial health, they can choose to hold a cash level 
above optimum even if it is costly. Also, the costs of using derivatives may alone be a reason 
not to hedge for constrained firms (Mello and Parsons, 2000). Therefore constrained firms 
with an incentive to hedge may not actively choose cash as an alternative tool, but do so to 
avoid hedging costs. This reasoning can also be applied to small cap firms.  
 
Second, our sample includes two specific industries with high R&D expenditures. Due to 
limited access to capital markets, firms with high levels of R&D may choose to hold more 
cash even if they hedge (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003). This way they also avoid potential 
problems with information asymmetries with investors and creditors. However, since holding 
excessive cash reserves is costly, hedgers in these industries should prefer using this capital 
for investments rather than as a risk reduction tool. According to this, a positive relationship 
between these risk management tools is not likely to occur for our sample firms. Third, our 
results may be affected by the definition of the hedging variable. It would be desirable to 
capture the value of a firm’s hedging position, however since hedging operations are off-
balance sheet posts10 the information is hard to acquire (Froot et al, 1993). The relationship 
between hedging and cash holdings can be expected to be stronger for firms with high value 
derivative positions, while firms that only have limited hedging positions can be expected to 
hold substantially higher amounts of cash. Our results are therefore limited by our binary 
variable for hedging, while a variable that captures this effect could have given different 
results.  
 
A fourth reason may be that hedging strategies can depend on market competition and 
competitors’ hedging strategies (Froot et al, 1993). Since our firms operate in the same sector 
and might be competitors, they can be biased towards competitors’ risk management strategy. 
The real effect may be hidden since firms rather follow market decisions than what could 
potentially be the best approach for the company. Fifth, Bolton et al. (2011) argue that firms 
with similar characteristics hold different cash levels, indicating that it is affected by more 
than one factor. To be able to find a relationship between hedging and cash management, we 
                                                 
10 It is possible to find information about fair value of hedging, but not real value.  
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might have to incorporate other measures to find significant results. This result is confirmed 
by our second and fourth models when accounting for increased investment opportunities. 
 
Finally, our results may be limited due to a homogenous sample and little variation within the 
firms. To examine whether this affects our results, we test pooled regressions to capture 
between firm variation. As suspected, we need this variation to reveal a significant 
relationship between hedging and cash holdings. Running Model 1 and 3 as pooled 
regressions show that hedging in fact has a negative and significant effect on cash holdings, 
indicating that hedgers hold less cash compared to non-hedgers, and that hedgers decrease 
their cash levels. Empirical studies have previously only confirmed this connection for 
financially constrained firms (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Bolton et al, 2011; Marin and 
Niehaus, 2011). Our results suggest that the relationship also holds for firms facing no 
financial constraints. This indicates that firms with high investment opportunities use cash 
and hedging as alternative risk management tools, and that hedgers have a lower optimal 
level of liquid assets compared to non-hedgers.  
  
We also test the relationship between hedging and cash under potential underinvestment 
problems to determine whether these agency costs strengthens the relationship. The results 
from Model 2 suggest that hedgers with an increased risk of underinvestment problems hold 
less cash than other firms. This negative relationship is supported by the result in Model 4, 
which indicates that hedging firms also decrease their cash levels with as much as 34% as 
potential underinvestment issues increase. This suggests that the relationship between 
hedging and cash holdings as alternative risk management tools is strengthened with high 
investment opportunities and potential underinvestment problems.  
 
A reasonable explanation to why we find a stronger substitutive relationship for hedgers who 
experience increased potential underinvestment problems, is that such agency costs can be 
mitigated through risk management (Culp, 2001). Our sample firms have large investment 
opportunities, meaning that the relationship is strengthened as firms rather invest their cash in 
these projects when they hedge. Companies with high investment opportunities are 
vulnerable to underinvestment problems if they use external capital for new investments (Gay 
and Nam, 1998). When these firms hedge their risks, they can use their internal cash holdings 
to fund projects and thereby avoid underinvestment. They do not need to hold large cash 
reserves for risk management purposes. Holding excessive amounts of cash increases the risk 
of being acquired, and R&D firms should be aware of this possible threat, since they are 
already valuable targets due to their unique and innovative operations. 
 
Our results may be affected by the time period of our sample, which we expect to be 
influenced by the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Opler et al (1999) argue that the main reason for 
large changes in cash holdings are due to operating losses, and may be why our results show 
a negative connection during this period. Also, during the crisis cash was difficult to obtain, 
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meaning that firms had to use their reserves during these years. Building up an optimal cash 
reserve may take time, which is why our period may reflect low cash levels.   
 
5.3 Other Determinants of Cash Management 
There are other factors than hedging that affects a firm’s cash levels. As discussed, 
investment opportunities have a positive effect on cash holdings, which is significant when 
we allow for between variation in our models. This means that firms with higher investment 
opportunities hold more cash, which can be explained by the precautionary motive for 
holding cash. This is also realistic when considering their need to move on good investments 
(Keynes, 1936). Again, the relationship cannot be proven in the fixed effects specifications, 
which might once again be due to by a lack of within variation in growth opportunities. Most 
likely firms’ investment opportunities are relatively stable over time.  
 
Another factor that supports the use of risk management tools, and influence the levels of 
cash holdings, is the likelihood to face financial distress. Our results suggest that firms with a 
higher probability of financial distress hold more cash, which is in line with our expectations. 
We also find evidence that these firms increase their cash levels. Both Opler et al. (1999) and 
Bolton et al. (2011) find similar results, which can be supported by the fact that holding cash 
can prevent an actual default, since easy accessible funds can be used to repay obligations. 
On the other hand, Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that some financially constrained firms 
with high investment opportunities hold low levels of cash according to persistently low cash 
flows, a problem that hedging can mitigate. Mian (1996) finds no significant relationship 
between risk management and possible financial distress. Our firms are not financially 
constrained and should therefore hold higher levels of cash as their likelihood to face 
financial distress increase.  
 
As problems with managerial risk aversion increase, firms are expected to hold more cash to 
lower the riskiness of new investments (Culp, 2001). However, we find that managerial risk 
aversion has a strong negative effect on cash holdings. This might be explained by firms 
wanting to avoid excessive spending, a view supported by previous research (Harford, 1999; 
Dittmar and Thakor, 2007). In fear of excessive spending and empire building, firms hold 
lower cash levels to limit bad investments. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) contradict this 
reasoning, arguing that cash hoarding might instead be essential for operations and find no 
support that high cash holdings lower firm performance. However, since good investments 
are of high importance to our sample firms, and investing in pet projects might get severe 
consequences, they may want to limit problems with excessive spending as managerial risk 
aversion increase.  
 
The last opportunity for risk management to create value is by decreasing the tax liability. As 
large cash reserves is a disadvantage seen from a tax perspective, we expect our firms to have 
lower cash holdings when they have a tax advantage. However, our results imply that as tax 
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benefits increase, firms hold more cash. This indicates that our sample firms do not base their 
cash management decisions on possible tax benefits. Holding costly cash reserves to be able 
to move on good investments is probably more important for our firms than a potential tax 
benefit. However, the results also indicate that these firms decrease their cash levels when 
having a tax advantage. Higher cash levels increase the tax liability and should therefore be 
avoided when a possible tax benefit exists (Opler et al, 1999). Also, firms that have a 
possible tax benefit should prefer hedging over holding cash, since it increases the post-tax 
firm value (Smith & Stulz, 1985).  
 
Firm size has a negative effect on cash holdings, which can be explained by a greater access 
to capital markets. Also, larger firms have a lower risk of facing financial distress, which 
reduces the need to hold cash reserves (Kim et al, 1998; Opler et al, 1999; Gill, 2012). Some 
empirical findings have shown a positive relationship between these firm aspects and changes 
in cash holdings (Almeida et al, 2004; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). Their results support the 
pecking order theory since firms will always prefer internal funding to external (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). However, our sample firms are dependent on good investments to be able to 
compete in their industries, and may therefore lower their cash levels to mitigate poor 
investments by managers in favor for an optimal cash level.  
 
The negative relationship between dividends and cash holdings is supported by the fact that 
firms with good access to capital markets reduce the need to hold costly cash reserves. The 
results also show that profitable firms hold more cash. This is not in line with our 
expectations, but can be explained by the precautionary motive as firms want to make sure to 
have easy access to internal funds when good investment opportunities appear.  
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5.5 Limitations  
Our sample consists of data from a five year period between 2009-2013. Since this period 
might include time-specific events, the results may be relevant only for these years. The 
recent financial crisis may have affected our results as firms might have had limited ability to 
choose optimal cash management and hedging strategies. As the economy has stabilized, 
firms may have begun to operate differently. Now firms might be more aware of financial 
risks and act according to this. Our results may therefore only be applicable for periods 
following a recession. 
 
Although we have managed to include a dynamic sample by covering firms from all market 
capitalizations, our results may not replicate the entire market as we only include firms from 
S&P 1500. The study is limited to public companies, meaning that the results are not 
applicable to private firms. However, the differences among private and public companies 
might be large in the context of risk management and meaningless to examine together. Also, 
private companies do not follow as strict disclosure practices, making it difficult to collect 
data on these companies.  
 
Another limitation that might affect the results is that we use a binomial variable for hedging. 
This limits our ability to find out whether firms that hedge more relative to other firms hold 
different cash levels, which would be interesting to examine as well as it could have given 
more significant results. The availability of such information is limited and is rarely disclosed 
in databases and annual reports, which is why we focused on a binomial variable. To retrieve 
the information needed for a relative hedging measure, a survey could have been carried out. 
Though, this is not realistic for our study, as it would probably have resulted in a low 
response rate.  
 
The proxies for several of our variables might capture other aspects than the ones we are 
interested in examining, and may thereby distort our results. One way to address this 
potential problem is to test different proxies for the variables as robustness. We do this with 
the proxy for underinvestment, by also testing Market-to-Book (Appendix 5).  The test shows 
that we get significant results between cash holdings and hedging for firms with high 
investment opportunities, also when using a different proxy. This means that our results are 
not dependent on the choice of variable. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The final chapter presents concluding remarks on our findings and suggestions for further  
research within the area of study.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 Concluding remarks  
This study has two main purposes. First, investigate whether hedging and cash holdings can 
be seen as substitutive risk management tools in the manner that hedgers can hold lower cash 
reserves. Second, examine if the relationship between hedging and cash holdings is 
strengthened under possible underinvestment problems.  
 
Our findings show that US firms with high investment opportunities hold significantly lower 
cash reserves compared to non-hedgers. Our results indicate that they hold much less cash, 
and that they lower their cash reserves with approximately 8%. It is important for firms with 
substantial growth opportunities and high investment rates to ensure a safe and stable access 
to capital. Firms whose operations rely on R&D and high improvement expenditures can use 
liquid resources to invest in value enhancing projects when they hedge, and do not have to 
hoard cash for risk reducing purposes. We show that hedging as a risk management tool has 
grown in importance over the years. Our results indicate that firms hedge more than earlier, 
but we also find that firms rarely change their hedging activity. It therefore becomes difficult 
to examine the effect implementation of a hedging program would have within a company.  
 
The risk of underinvestment problems is imminent for investment intensive companies. We 
find that hedging firms can lower their cash reserves as investment opportunities increase, 
and our results suggest that firms in this case reduce their cash levels with as much as 34%. 
This means that the overall results support the theory on risk management. It also supports 
hedging and cash reserves as alternative risk management tools.  
 
As our results indicate, determining an optimal cash level is a complex decision that is 
influenced by many different factors. We conclude that firms with substantial investment 
opportunities have a reason to hedge so that cash reserves can be used for investments. This 
allows them to use their liquidity on value-enhancing projects. Non-hedgers must instead 
hold cash reserves for risk reducing purposes. Hedging and cash holdings can thereby be seen 
as alternative risk management tools.  
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6.2 Suggestions for further research  
Our focus is directed towards the relationship between hedging and cash management in the 
presence of potential underinvestment problems. There are several other firm aspects that 
may affect this relationship that can be examined. For example, it would be interesting to test 
the relationship between cash and hedging in the presence of either managerial risk aversion, 
likelihood of financial distress or tax convexity. The importance of risk reducing activities 
differs between industries and sectors and it can therefore be interesting to examine other 
firms. Further, this research area can be examined over a longer period to mitigate potential 
biases from specific events. Including a longer time period might capture variation in the 
hedging variable, thereby making it possible to examine the effect on cash levels when 
hedging strategies change. Intuitively, the relationship between hedging and cash holdings 
should be strongest when a firm chooses to change their risk management programs and 
implements hedging in their strategy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 - 48 - 
 
7. REFERENCES 
 
7.1 Literature  
 
Angrist, J.D. & Pischke, J.S (2008). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion. 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Brooks, C, (2008). Introductory Econometrics for Finance, 2nd edition, Cambridge University 
Press  
 
Bryman, A. & Bell, E. (2007). Business research methods. Oxford, Oxford University Press  
 
Culp, C.L. (2001). The Risk Management Process: Business Strategy and Tactics. Wiley  
 
Greene, W.H. (2002). Econometric Analysis. 5th edition, New York University  
 
Gujarati, D. N. & Porter, D. C. (2010). Essentials of Econometrics, New York, McGraw-Hill 
 
Jacobsen, D. I. (2002). Vad, hur och varför? – Om metodval i företagsekonomi och andra 
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8. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 - List of companies included in sample  
  
Large Cap 
  
1. Agilent Technologies Inc      Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
2. AbbVie                                  Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
3. AmerisourceBergen Corp      Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
4. Abbott Laboratories              Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
5. Actavis plc                            Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
6. Allergan Inc                          Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
7. Alexion Pharmaceuticals       Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
8. Amgen Inc                            Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
9. Baxter International Inc.         Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices          
10. Bard (C.R.) Inc.                         Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
11. Becton Dickinson                 Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
12. BIOGEN IDEC Inc.               Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
13. Bristol-Myers Squibb             Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
14. Boston Scientific                   Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
15. Celgene Corp.                       Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
16. Dentsply International          Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
17. Endo International                Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
18. Edwards Lifesciences             Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
19. Gilead Sciences                      Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
20. Hospira Inc.                          Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
21. Intuitive Surgical Inc.            Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
22. Johnson & Johnson               Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
23. Lilly (Eli) & Co.                   Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
24. McKesson Corp.                Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
25. Medtronic Inc.                      Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
26. Merck & Co.                         Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
27. Mylan Inc.                            Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
28. Patterson Companies            Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
29. Pfizer Inc.                             Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
30. PerkinElmer                         Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
31. Perrigo                                  Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
32. Quest Diagnostics             Large Cap   Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
33. Regeneron                             Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
34. St Jude Medical                      Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
35. Thermo Fisher Scientific       Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
36. Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc   Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
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37. Waters Corporation           Large Cap     Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
38. Zimmer Holdings                  Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
39. Zoetis                                   Large Cap     Medical Equipments & Devices 
  
Mid Cap 
  
1. Bio-Rad Laboratories-A Mid Cap        Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
2. Cooper Companies Inc          Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
3. Charles River Laboratories    Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
4. Covance Inc                          Mid Cap        Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
5. Hologic Inc                           Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
6. Hill-Rom Holdings Inc          Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
7. IDEXX Laboratories Inc       Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
8. Masimo Corp                        Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
9. Mallinckrodt plc                   Mid Cap        Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
10. ResMed Inc                           Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
11. Salix Pharmaceuticals Ltd     Mid Cap        Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
12. Steris Corp                            Mid Cap        Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
13. Techne Corp                         Mid Cap        Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
14. Teleflex Inc                          Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
15. Thoratec Corp                      Mid Cap        Medical Equipments & Devices 
16. United Therapeutics Corp     Mid Cap        Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
  
Small Cap 
  
1. Abaxis Inc                             Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
2. Abiomed Inc.                        Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
3. Affymetrix Inc                        Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
4. Akorn, Inc.                           Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
5. Analogic Corp                       Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
6. Albany Molecular Research   Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
7. Anika Therapeutics Inc.        Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
8. Cambrex Corp                    Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
9. Conmed Corp                        Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
10. Cryolife Inc                          Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
11. Cyberonics Inc                   Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
12. Cynosure                               Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
13. Emergent Biosolutions Inc    Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
14. Greatbatch Inc                   Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
15. Haemonetics Corp                Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
16. Integra Lifesciences Hldg      Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
17. ICU Medical Inc                 Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
18. Impax Laboratories               Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
19. Invacare Corp                       Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
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20. Lannett Company Inc.          Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
21. Landauer Inc                         Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
22. Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc.  Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
23. Luminex Corp.                   Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
24. The Medicines Company      Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
25. Meridian Bioscience Inc        Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
26. Merit Medical Systems Inc    Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
27. Momenta Pharmaceuticals    Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
28. Natus Medical Inc                 Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
29. Neogen Corp                         Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
30. NuVasive Inc.                        Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
31. Questcor Pharmaceuticals  Small Cap    Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
32. Repligen Corporation            Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
33. Symmetry Medical                Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
34. Spectrum Pharmaceuticals     Small Cap      Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
35. SurModics Inc                       Small Cap      Medical Equipment & Devices 
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Appendix 2 - Eviews Outputs 2SLS and Hausman test   
 
Reduced form equation  
 
Dependent Variable: DUMMY_HEDGING  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/15   Time: 18:57   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 77   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 275  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LOG_STOPTIONS 0.003375 0.141903 0.080544 0.0935 
INVOP 0.007688 0.003820 2.012586 0.0456 
TAX 0.020572 0.009020 2.280596 0.0237 
LFD 0.011210 0.004960 2.260104 0.0249 
MRA 1.121821 0.823687 1.361950 0.1748 
DUMMY_DIVIDEND -0.015047 0.012192 -1.234199 0.2187 
SIZE 0.084423 0.039517 2.136405 0.0339 
ROA -0.264227 0.175815 -1.502866 0.1345 
C -0.089620 0.330509 -0.271157 0.7866 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.967677    Mean dependent var 0.629091 
Adjusted R-squared 0.953386    S.D. dependent var 0.483929 
S.E. of regression 0.104481    Akaike info criterion -1.431183 
Sum squared resid 2.074103    Schwarz criterion -0.313272 
Log likelihood 281.7877    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.982534 
F-statistic 67.71545    Durbin-Watson stat 1.606264 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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2SLS – CH as dependent variable  
 
Dependent Variable: LOG_CASH  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 05/16/15   Time: 19:15   
Sample: 1 450    
Included observations: 275   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Instrument specification: MRA SIZE ROA INVOP TAX 
        DUMMY_DIVIDEND LFD C LOG_STOPTIONS 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     MRA -13.30587 58.34356 -0.228061 0.8198 
SIZE 0.415179 1.272648 0.326232 0.7445 
INVOP -0.009301 0.193274 -0.048125 0.9617 
ROA 6.716253 9.891892 0.678966 0.4978 
DUMMY_DIVIDEND 0.322669 1.519941 0.212291 0.8320 
DUMMY_HEDGING -3.870381 11.81704 -0.327526 0.7435 
LFD -0.009734 0.104887 -0.092803 0.9261 
TAX 0.113649 0.107026 1.061883 0.2893 
C -3.293049 2.189673 -1.503900 0.1338 
     
     R-squared -1.490077    Mean dependent var -2.128354 
Adjusted R-squared -1.564966    S.D. dependent var 0.929274 
S.E. of regression 1.488279    Sum squared resid 589.1836 
F-statistic 2.691442    Durbin-Watson stat 0.671066 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007320    Second-Stage SSR 188.9208 
J-statistic 6.92E-37    Instrument rank 9 
     
     
 
J-stat from Hausman Test  
Endogenous variables to treat as exogenous: DUMMY_HEDGING 
         
     
      Value df Probability  
Difference in J-stats  3.022441  1  0.2206  
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2SLS – ∆CH as dependent variable  
 
 
Dependent Variable: CHANGE_CH   
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 05/16/15   Time: 19:43   
Sample (adjusted): 2 450   
Included observations: 224 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: MANAGERIAL_RISK_AVERSION SIZE 
        UNDERINVESTMENT ROA DUMMY_DIVIDEND LIKELIHOOD_OF_FD_ 
        _ZSCORE CONCAVE_TAX_CURVE LOG_STOCK_OPTIONS_ C 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     MANAGERIAL_RISK_AVERSION -1.281531 0.685190 -1.870331 0.0628 
SIZE -0.011578 0.010626 -1.089519 0.2771 
UNDERINVESTMENT -0.006853 0.007735 -0.885951 0.3766 
ROA -0.477102 0.267078 -1.786376 0.1754 
DUMMY_DIVIDEND -0.026304 0.032531 -0.808577 0.4197 
DUMMY_HEDGING -0.097354 0.036443 -2.671404 0.1181 
LIKELIHOOD_OF_FD__ZSCORE 0.002580 0.002130 1.210886 0.2273 
CONCAVE_TAX_CURVE -0.196271 0.006570 -29.87304 0.0000 
C 0.265970 0.079312 3.353458 0.0009 
     
     R-squared 0.888694    Mean dependent var -0.011530 
Adjusted R-squared 0.884552    S.D. dependent var 0.578504 
S.E. of regression 0.196562    Sum squared resid 8.306875 
F-statistic 214.5756    Durbin-Watson stat 1.114891 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Second-Stage SSR 8.306875 
J-statistic 8.763602    Instrument rank 9 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.003073    
     
     
 
 
J-stat from Hausman Test  
 
 
Endogenous variables to treat as exogenous: DUMMY_HEDGING  
     
      Value df Probability  
Difference in J-stats  0.137997  1  0.7103  
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Appendix 3 – Eviews outputs from testing  
 
Redundant fixed effects likelihood ratio test  
 
Model 1  
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: LOG_CH_1   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 10.301233 (86,261) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 526.987779 86 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: LOG_CH_1   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.144981 (4,343) 0.9651 
Period Chi-square 0.601397 4 0.9629 
     
     
 
 
Model 2 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: LOG_CH_2   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 9.785469 (86,260) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 513.990034 86 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: LOG_CH_2   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.228888 (4,342) 0.9221 
Period Chi-square 0.951756 4 0.9170 
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Model 3 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: CHANGE_CH_3   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 2.607660 (86,195) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 221.991746 86 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: CHANGE_CH_3   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.783072 (3,278) 0.5042 
Period Chi-square 2.440326 3 0.4862 
     
     
 
 
Model 4  
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: CHANGE_CH_4   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 1.988741 (86,194) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 183.316594 86 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: CHANGE_CH_4   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.624220 (3,277) 0.5999 
Period Chi-square 1.953948 3 0.5820 
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Hausman specification test for random effects in cross-section 
 
 
Model 1  
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: LOG_CH_1   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 18.809921 8 0.0159 
     
     
 
     
Model 2 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: LOG_CH_2   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 24.952683 9 0.0030 
     
     
 
Model 3 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: CHANGE_CH_3   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 25.014546 8 0.0015 
     
     
 
Model 4  
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 27.254103 9 0.0013 
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Correlation Matrix 
  
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary         
Date: 05/18/15   Time: 10:24         
Sample: 2009 2013          
Included observations: 356         
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)        
           
           
Correlation          
Probability D_HEDGING  D_DIVIDEND  INVOP SIZE  ROA  MRA LFD 
HEDGE_IN
VOP TAX  
D_HEDGING  1.000000          
 -----           
           
D_DIVIDEND  0.340209 1.000000         
 0.0000 -----          
           
INVOP  -0.132740 -0.109557 1.000000        
 0.0122 0.0388 -----         
           
SIZE  0.575688 0.470267 -0.098920 1.000000       
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0623 -----        
           
ROA  0.098107 0.104385 -0.288235 0.127636 1.000000      
 0.0645 0.0491 0.0000 0.0160 -----       
           
MRA -0.324400 -0.218416 0.037250 -0.309841 0.020241 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 0.4835 0.0000 0.7035 -----      
           
LFD -0.262690 -0.113923 -0.129461 -0.232576 0.392663 0.106667 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0316 0.0145 0.0000 0.0000 0.0443 -----     
           
HEDGE_INVO
P  0.194483 -0.035236 0.192135 -0.084099 -0.055425 -0.063779 -0.437453 1.000000   
 0.0002 0.5075 0.0003 0.1132 0.0970 0.2300 0.0000 -----    
           
TAX -0.036000 -0.106615 0.235499 -0.254367 -0.151779 -0.031848 -0.413803 0.580161 1.000000  
 0.4984 0.0444 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 0.0492 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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Appendix 4 - Descriptive Statistics  
 
Large Cap  
  
n=184 
  
      
Ratio Mean Median Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
Hedging Dummy  0.863 1 0.35 0 1 
Cash/Total Assets 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.012 1.11 
Total Assets  23972 9616 38038 741 212949 
Total Sales  15955 5580 24922 18.4 122734 
Market Value of Equity  31936 15610 42993 1961 212543 
Return on Asset  0.08 0.09 0.05 (0.11) 0.27 
Dividend Dummy  0.56 1 0.50 0 1 
R&D/Sales  0.41 0.092 2.28 0.0 21.67 
Note: The table displays the mean, median and standard deviations of all Large Cap firms for important 
firm aspects. The numbers are in million dollars and contains values from 184 observations. 
 
Mid Cap  
  
n=66 
  
      
Ratio Mean Median Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
Hedging Dummy  0.66 1 0.48 0 1 
Cash/Total Assets 0.169 0.149 0.12 0.001 0.61 
Total Assets  2139 1572 1898 310 10477 
Total Sales  1134 1190 583 233 2492 
Market Value of Equity  2989 2545 1380 1112 6685 
Return on Asset  0.084 0.071 0.05 (0.05) 0.20 
Dividend Dummy  0.42 0 0.049 0 1 
R&D/Sales  0.09 0.065 0.08 0.0 0.38 
Note: The table displays the mean, median and standard deviations of all Mid Cap firms for important firm 
aspects. The numbers are in million dollars and contains values from 66 observations. 
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Small Cap  n=156 
      
Ratio Mean Median Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
Hedging Dummy  0.34 0.0 0.47 0 1 
Cash/Total Assets 0.212 0.14 0.39 0.01 4.11 
Total Assets  437.9 308 361 7.4 1741 
Total Sales  319 218 314 1.4 1722 
Market Value of Equity  694 576 490.6 89.4 2644 
Return on Asset  0.066 0.058 0.10 (0.32) 0.70 
Dividend Dummy  0.124 0 0.36 0.0 1 
R&D/Sales  0.305 0.08 0.91 0.0 8.5 
Note: The table displays the mean, median and standard deviations of all Small Cap firms for important 
firm aspects. The numbers are in million dollars and contains values from 156 observations. 
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Appendix 5 - Robustness tests   
 
Robustness Test with MtB as proxy for Investment Opportunities  
 
Model 1  
 
Dependent Variable: LOG_CASH_TA  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/15   Time: 20:21   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 87   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 358  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     MANAGERIAL_RISK_AVERSION 0.974475 1.330408 0.732463 0.4644 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.000938 0.006865 0.136576 0.8914 
SIZE 0.051263 0.040594 1.262820 0.2075 
ROA 3.171133 0.942524 3.364511 0.0009 
LIKELIHOOD_OF_FD__ZSCORE 0.023412 0.006806 3.439643 0.0007 
DUMMY_HEDGING -0.549872 0.132718 -4.143167 0.0000 
DUMMY_DIVIDEND -0.160633 0.116082 -1.383781 0.1673 
CONCAVE_TAX_CURVE 0.105317 0.040282 2.614518 0.0093 
C -2.590021 0.292055 -8.868259 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.196641    Mean dependent var -2.157391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.178226    S.D. dependent var 0.983067 
S.E. of regression 0.891167    Akaike info criterion 2.632249 
Sum squared resid 277.1686    Schwarz criterion 2.729805 
Log likelihood -462.1726    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.671047 
F-statistic 10.67827    Durbin-Watson stat 0.845337 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Model 2 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG_CASH_TA  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/15   Time: 20:22   
Sample: 2009 2013   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 87   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 358  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     MANAGERIAL_RISK_AVERSION 0.755824 1.378261 0.548389 0.5838 
MARKET_TO_BOOK -0.048938 0.017077 -2.865701 0.0044 
SIZE 0.058162 0.039320 1.479173 0.1400 
ROA 3.701889 0.990015 3.739226 0.0002 
LIKELIHOOD_OF_FD__ZSCORE 0.022514 0.006496 3.465933 0.0006 
DUMMY_HEDGING -0.869059 0.167162 -5.198919 0.0000 
DUMMY_DIVIDEND -0.111304 0.114845 -0.969170 0.3331 
CONCAVE_TAX_CURVE 0.278857 0.080243 3.475173 0.0006 
MTB_INTERACTION 0.079705 0.028333 2.813199 0.0052 
C -2.510623 0.281485 -8.919199 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.216548    Mean dependent var -2.157391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196286    S.D. dependent var 0.983067 
S.E. of regression 0.881320    Akaike info criterion 2.612744 
Sum squared resid 270.3005    Schwarz criterion 2.721139 
Log likelihood -457.6812    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.655853 
F-statistic 10.68757    Durbin-Watson stat 0.854173 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Model 3 
 
Dependent Variable: CHANGE_CH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/15   Time: 20:20   
Sample (adjusted): 2010 2013   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 87   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 291  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CONCAVE_TAX_CURVE -0.101564 0.013360 -7.602140 0.0000 
DUMMY_DIVIDEND -0.027792 0.018972 -1.464930 0.1441 
DUMMY_HEDGING -0.035512 0.026199 -1.355452 0.1764 
LIKELIHOOD_OF_FD__ZSCORE 0.002003 0.002774 0.721852 0.4710 
MANAGERIAL_RISK_AVERSION -0.337535 0.319104 -1.057757 0.2911 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.018778 0.002466 7.615761 0.0000 
ROA -0.479529 0.239987 -1.998148 0.0467 
SIZE -0.010553 0.007407 -1.424709 0.1553 
C 0.119023 0.069044 1.723881 0.0858 
     
     R-squared 0.805766    Mean dependent var 0.002411 
Adjusted R-squared 0.800256    S.D. dependent var 0.554323 
S.E. of regression 0.247742    Akaike info criterion 0.077583 
Sum squared resid 17.30807    Schwarz criterion 0.191191 
Log likelihood -2.288270    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.123094 
F-statistic 146.2325    Durbin-Watson stat 0.600342 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Model 4  
 
Dependent Variable: CHANGE_CH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/15   Time: 20:21   
Sample (adjusted): 2010 2013   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 87   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 291  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CONCAVE_TAX_CURVE -0.064929 0.020139 -3.224097 0.0014 
DUMMY_DIVIDEND -0.016195 0.020885 -0.775401 0.4388 
DUMMY_HEDGING -0.106571 0.026506 -4.020602 0.0001 
LIKELIHOOD_OF_FD__ZSCORE 0.002022 0.002722 0.742949 0.4581 
MANAGERIAL_RISK_AVERSION -0.396533 0.315396 -1.257256 0.2097 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.008037 0.005438 1.477947 0.1405 
ROA -0.412517 0.233938 -1.763357 0.0789 
SIZE -0.008499 0.007140 -1.190335 0.2349 
MTB_INTERACTION 0.016951 0.008418 2.013567 0.0450 
C 0.135635 0.069309 1.956957 0.0513 
     
     R-squared 0.808795    Mean dependent var 0.002411 
Adjusted R-squared 0.802671    S.D. dependent var 0.554323 
S.E. of regression 0.246240    Akaike info criterion 0.068738 
Sum squared resid 17.03816    Schwarz criterion 0.194969 
Log likelihood -0.001319    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.119306 
F-statistic 132.0701    Durbin-Watson stat 0.573964 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
  
SPOTLIGHT ON CASH MANAGEMENT  
Spotlight: Interview with Andrea Bjørndalen and Johanna Nilsson  
 
83  Harvard Business Review  June 2015 
Hedging allows firms to use their 
cash reserves on investments  
  
 
Capital requirements and funding needs is a constant concern for 
companies with large investment opportunities. Two master students from 
Lund University have studied cash management from a risk point of view. 
Few researchers have focused on corporate liquidity from this perspective, 
and the new findings constitute a major breakthrough in the corporate 
world. 
  
The findings reveal that hedging and cash 
holdings are used as substitutive risk 
management tools. We meet with Andrea 
Bjørndalen and Johanna Nilsson for an exclusive 
interview. They are both graduating in June 
2015 and have spent their last semester 
researching the connection between hedging and 
cash management. “High growth companies, 
especially those who rely on heavy R&D 
investments, struggle to avoid underinvestment 
problems,” Andrea Bjørndalen begins, “and a 
critical factor to prevent such problems is 
reliable availability of cash.” Lack of sufficient 
funds means that firms must refrain from 
pursuing value-enhancing investment. Engaging 
in risk management can reduce the need to turn 
to capital markets and creditors for expensive 
funding, which reduces the risk of expropriating 
wealth at the expense of creditors. Instead, 
hedging helps stabilize cash inflows and lets 
firms use their liquidity for other purposes.  
  
Johanna Nilsson states that hedging has 
increased both in popularity and in importance 
in later years, and can be explained by a more 
globalized market place. While a study 
conducted in the beginning of the 90s found that 
around 30% hedged their risk exposures, 
Bjørndalen and Nilsson find that as many as 61% 
of the firms in their study hedge. The study 
reveals that hedgers in fact hold less cash 
compared to non-hedgers. “Firms that do not 
hedge must reserve some of their cash holdings 
to be able to deal with unforeseen events, which 
might be a costly strategy for high investment 
firms” Nilsson explains.  
 
The study also reveals that firms with high 
investments in R&D, and firms that face an 
increased risk of underinvestment, have even 
more to gain from hedging than the average 
firm. By hedging, these firms have the 
opportunity to use internal capital for funding 
investment opportunities and still have the 
ability to deal with unforeseen events. However, 
even if the substitutive relationship between 
hedging and cash has now been proven, 
determining an optimal cash level is still a 
complex decision.  
 
Bjørndalen and Nilsson emphasize executives to 
look over their cash management strategies from 
a risk perspective, as this may add value to more 
stakeholders. “There may be major saving 
potentials through lowering cash holdings to an 
optimal level without compromising the 
management of risks”, Bjørndalen concludes. 
“But also, the area has not yet been studied to a 
great extent, and we are sure that we will be able 
to examine the relationship between cash 
holdings and hedging closer in the future.”  
 
